An integration of case-based and model-based reasoning and its application to physical system faults by Karamouzis, Stamos T.
W&M ScholarWorks 
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 
1993 
An integration of case-based and model-based reasoning and its 
application to physical system faults 
Stamos T. Karamouzis 
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd 
 Part of the Computer Sciences Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Karamouzis, Stamos T., "An integration of case-based and model-based reasoning and its application to 
physical system faults" (1993). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539623838. 
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-z71y-tc95 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M 
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized 
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
INFORMATION TO USERS
This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI 
films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some 
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may 
be from any type of computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the 
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality 
illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, 
and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete 
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if 
unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate 
the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by 
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and 
continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each 
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in 
reduced form at the back of the book.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced 
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white 
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations 
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly 
to order.
University Microfilms International 
A Bell & Howell Information C om pany 
300 North Z ee b  Road. Ann Arbor. Ml 48106-1346 USA 
313/761-4700 800/521-0600

Order Num ber 9414200
A n integration o f case-based and m odel-based reasoning and its 
application to  physical system  faults
Karam ouzis, Stam os T ., Ph .D .
The College of William and Mary, 1993
Copyright © 1993 by Karamouzis, Stamos T. All rights reserved.
UMI
300 N. Zeeb Rd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48106

An Integration of Case-Based and Model-Based Reasoning
and
its Application to Physical System Faults
A Dissertation 
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of Computer Science 
The College of William and Mary in Virginia
In Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
by
Stamos T. Karamouzis 
1993
Copyright © 1993 by Stamos T. Karamouzis, All Rights Reserved
APPROVAL SHEET
This Dissertation is submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor o f Philosophy
a
Stamos T. Karamouzis
Approved, July 1993
Dr. William L. Bynum 
Dr. W, Robert Collins
Dr. Stefan Feyock 
(Chair)
Dr. Alan Pope 
NASA^angley Research Center^
| D t  Richard H. Prosl '
/ Z .s  r7 c
Paul C. Schutte 
NASA Langley Research center
Dedication
This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Triantafillos and Vassiliki Karamouzi, and to my sister 
Yiota Karamouzi for their love, support, and sacrifices.
-  iii -
Table of Contents
Dedication  .....................................   iii
Table or C o n te n ts ....................................................................................................... iv
Acknowledgments......................................................................................................vii
List of F ig u re s ......................................................................................................
A b strac t................................................   ix
1. CBR and Physical S y s te m s ............................................................................................... 3
1.1 Tile Problem................................................................................................................... 4
1.2 Approach......................................................................................................................... 6
1.3 M e th o d o lo g y .............................................................................................................. 8
1.4 R e s u l t s ......................................................   10
1.5 Comparison to Other W o rk ....................................................................................... 12
2. Case-Based Reasoning....................................................................................................... 19
2.1 Case-Based Reasoning P a ra d ig m ............................................................................20
2.1.1 Memory O rganization ................................................................................. 21
2.1.2 I n d e x in g .......................................................................................................24
2.1.3 R e t r ie v a l .......................................................................................................25
2.1.4 Adaptation.......................................................................................................28
2.1.5 T esting ............................................................................................................ 31
2.1.6 Failure Explanation....................................................................................... 32
2.1.7 R e p a i r .............................................................................................................32
2.2 CBR versus Rule-Based S y s te m s ............................................................................33
2.3 Prototypical CBR S y s te m s .......................................................................................35
2.3.1 CYRUS............................................................................................................ 35
2.3.2 M ED IA TO R .................................................................................................. 36
2.3.3 S W A L E .......................................................................................................37
2.3.4 P L E X U S .......................................................................................................37
2.3.5 JUD G E............................................................................................................ 38
2.3.6 M B R ta lk .......................................................................................................38
2.3.7 C I 1 E F ............................................................................................................ 39
- i v -
Table o f  Contents
3. Formal Specifications .  .................................................................................................40
3.1 Rationale.......................................................................................................................41
3.2 M o d e l s .......................................................................................................................41
3.3 Case-Based Diagnosis..................................................................................................44
3.4 Use o f Models in Case Based D iagnosis................................................................. 49
4. A P r o to ty p e ............................................................................................................................52
4.1 Introduction................................................................................................................. 53
4.2 The d o m a in ................................................................................................................. 54
4.3 Knowledge S o u r c e s ................................................................................................. 56
4.3.1 Case L ib ra ry ..................................................................................................56
4.3.2 Causality M o d e l............................................................................................ 58
4.3.3 Functional Dependency M o d e l ..................................................................59
4.3.4 Physical Dependency M o d e l....................................................................... 61
4.3.5 The Abstraction Hierarchy............................................................................ 62
4.4 Reasoning C y c l e .......................................................................................................63
4.4.1 Case Matching and Retrieval P r o c e s s ....................................................... 63
4.4.2 The Case Adaptation Process....................................................................... 64
5. Evaluation................................................................................................................................. 69
5.1 Introduction..................................................................................................................70
5.2 Examples.......................................................................................................................71
5.2.1 First Scenario..................................................................................................71
5.2.2 Second Scenario............................................................................................ 73
5.3 Analytical Evaluation of the M ethodo logy ...........................   76
5.3.1 The Functional Dependencies S u b m o d e l..................................................78
5.3.2 The Physical Dependencies Submodel  ............................ 80
5.3.3 The Causal Dependencies S u b m o d e l ....................................................... 81
5.3.4 The Abstraction Hierarchy.............................................................................82
5.4 Empirical Evaluation of the Prototype.......................................................................83
5.4.1 R esults............................................................................................................. 85
5.4.2 Discussion....................................................................................................... 90
6. D iscussion................................................................................................................................. 93
6.1 C o n tr ib u tio n s ............................................................................................................ 94
6.2 L im ita tio n s ................................................................................................................. 96
6.3 Future W o r k ........................................................................................................... 97
6.3.1 Representing MOPs in L IM A P ..................................................................97
6.3.2 Prognostication  ....................................................................... 98
6.3.3 Multiple Independent F a u l t s ....................................................................... 99
6.3.4 Simulation and the Physical M o d e l...........................................................100
6.4 C o n c lu sio n ................................................................................................................101
-  v -
Table o f  Contents
A. LIM AP: A modeling to o l ......................................................................................................102
A .l Introduction.................................................................................................................103
A.2 Matrices and Semantic N e ts ......................................................................................104
A.3 Implementation........................................................................................................... 106
A.3.1 DDL Operations..........................................................................................106
A.3.2 Path Operations: TCLOSE and PATHS.................................................117
A.3.3 Control S tru c tu re s .....................................................................................122
A.4 Conclusion  ................................................................................................. 124
B. Case L ib ra ry ............................................................................................................................125
B .l Fuel Metering U nit......................................................................................................126
B.2 Fuel Boost P u m p ......................................................................................................128
B.3 Ice Ingestion.................................................................................................................130
B.4 Ice Ingestion.................................................................................................................132
B.5 Ice Ingestion.................................................................................................................134
B.6 Volcanic Ash In g e s tio n ........................................................................................... 136
B.7 Foreign Object Ingestion........................................................................................... 138
B.8 Fan Blade Damage......................................................................................................140
B.9 Fan Blade Damage......................................................................................................142
B.10 Fan Blade Damage......................................................................................................144
B .ll  Turbine Blade Separation...........................................................................................146
B.12 Turbine Blade Separation...........................................................................................148
B.13 Engine Separation......................................................................................................150
B.14 Bad Fuel C o n tro l le r .................................................................................................152
B.15 Volcanic Ash In g e s tio n ........................................................................................... 154
B.16 Volcanic Ash In g e s tio n ...........................................................................................156
B.17 Massive Water Ingestion........................................................................................... 158
B.18 Ice Ingestion............................................................................................   160
B .l9 Ice Ingestion.................................................................................................................162
B ib liog raphy ...........................................................   164
-  vi -
Acknowledgments
The task of acknowledging all the people who contributed in this research is a very difficult one, 
since there so many people who contributed, influenced, encouraged, and supported this effort.
I particularly want to thank the following people:
My advisor, Stefan Feyock, for teaching me about artificial intelligence. Without his scientific 
knowledge, collegial advice, and unique sense o f humor this thesis would not have been possible.
My committee members: Bill Bynum, Bob Collins, Alan Pope, Richard Prosl, and Paul Schutte.
My friends at William and Mary: Antonis, Ashok, Chris, Malt, Raja, Tracy, and others.
I want to especially thank Courtney, Cheavn, and Cameron Frantz for their support, concern and 
their cookies-and-crcam ice-cream.
This work was supported by NASA grant NCC-I-159 and conducted at NASA/Langley Research 
Center in Virginia. I ’m grateful to all members of the Human Automation Branch for providing me 
the resources and support necessary to carry on this research. Special thanks to Kathy Abbott, for 
giving the green light to every request; Paul Schulte, for carefully keeping an eye on the research; 
Steve Smith, for keeping the systems running; and John Barry for saving me every time the Lisp 
code became the monster in my bedtime nightmares.
List of Figures
Figure 1.1: Models of the reasoning system and their in teractions.................................................11
Figure 2.1: Snapshot of Case-Based Reasoner’s memory orgainzation..................................... - . 2 6
Figure 3.1: Classification of d ep en d e n c ie s ......................................................................................43
Figure 4.1: Schematic of a lurbofan jet e n g in e .................................................................................56
Figure 4.2: Functional dependency graph of an engine...................................................................... 60
Figure 4.3: Adjacency matrix for jet engine depicted in figure 4 . 1 .................................................61
Figure 4.4: A causal s c e n a r i o ............................................................................................................66
Figure 4.5: Relation <t>t causes <J>2 .........................................................................................................67
Figure 4.6: A causal s c e n a r i o ......................................................................  67
Figure 4.7: A causal s c e n a r i o ............................................................................................................68
Figure 5.1: Causal explanations of retrieved and current c a s e ......................................................75
Figure 6.1: LIMAP’s data definition procedures, and their associated syntax.............................. 106
Figure 6.2: Contents of the Definition Table . .  .................................................................... 108
Figure 6.3: LIMAPs DML operations  ..........................................................................................110
Figure 6.4: Code for transitive closure............................................................................................... 118
Figure 6.5: Example n e t w o r k ..........................................................................................................119
Figure 6.6: Warshall’s A lg o rith m .....................................................................................................120
Figure 6.7: Contents of the definition t a b l e .................................................................................... 122
-  viii -
Abstract
Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) systems solve new problems by finding stored instances of prob­
lems similar to the current one, and by adapting previous solutions to fit the current problem, tak­
ing into consideration any differences between the current and previous situations. CBR has been 
proposed as a more robust and plausible model of expert reasoning than the better-known rule- 
based systems. Current CBR systems have been used in planning, engineering design, and mem­
ory organization. There has been minimal work, however, in the area of reasoning about physical 
systems. This type o f reasoning is a difficult task, and every attempt to automate the process must 
overcome the problems o f modeling normal behavior, diagnosing faults, and predicting future 
behavior.
CBR systems are quite difficult to compare and evaluate, because until now there has been no 
common mathematical framework in which the systems can be described. The only avenue avail­
able at present for comparison and evaluation of CBR systems requires an intellectual synthesis of 
the semantics of the implementations. Important constraints on the operation o f a CBR system are 
often hidden in obscure programming tricks in the system’s source code.
This thesis presents a hybrid methodology for reasoning about physical systems in operation. Our 
methodology is based on retrieval and adaptation of previously experienced problems similar to 
the problem at hand. In this methodology the ability o f a CBR to reason about a physical system is 
significantly enhanced by the addition to the case-based reasoner of a model o f the physical sys­
tem. The model describes the physical system's structural, functional, and causal behavior.
Additionally, this thesis presents a mathematical formalization of the case-based reasoning para­
digm and a formal specification of the interaction of the CBR component with the model-based 
component of a case-based system. Tb prove the feasibility and the merit o f such methodology, a 
prototypical system for dealing with the faults of a physical system has being designed and imple­
mented. Testing has shown that this hybrid methodology allows the generation of diagnoses and 
prognoses that arc beyond the capabilities of current reasoning systems.
" o u t ©  navi xi epoooiv ot noXXoi ruiaq, 
c t X X  oxi (ertei) o enaicov.”
—  Socrates
An Integration of Case-Based and Model-Based Reasoning
and
its Application to Physical System Faults
Chapter 1
CBR and Physical Systems
1 CBR and Physical Systems
1.1 The Problem
1.1 The Problem
We consider a physical syslcm as a set of components connected together in a manner to achieve a 
certain function. Components are the parts that the system consists of, and may themselves be 
composed of other components. For example, an engine is a component in an airplane and it is 
composed of other components such as a compressor, a combustor, a fan etc. Components which 
are composed of other components are called subsystems.
Reasoning about physical systems is a difficult process, and every attempt to automate this process 
must overcome many challenges. Among these are the tasks of generating explanations of normal 
behavior, fault diagnoses, explanations of the various manifestations of faults, prediction of future 
behavior, etc. The reasoning process becomes even more difficult when physical systems must 
remain in operation. During operation, a physical system is changing dynamically by modifying its 
set of components, the components’ pattern of interconnections, and the system’s behavior. See 
Figure 1.1 on page 11.
Explaining normal behavior is the process of elaborating the function o f each subsystem and how 
tills function contributes to die overall operation of the system. Explaining the operation of an 
automobile, for example, would require knowledge of the function of the carburetor, operation of 
the fuel pump, movement of the wheels, etc., and how all these affect each other and contribute to 
the final operation of moving the automobile. There are several approaches to explaining the nor­
mal behavior of physical systems by means of a model o f the system. These approaches include 
naive physics (Hayes 1979], qualitative physics fdeKlcer 1985; Forbus 1985; Kuipers 1985], bond 
graphs [Rosenberg & Kamopp 1983, Feyock 1991], causality models, and others, each of them 
achieving various degrees of success and various advantages over the others.
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Fault diagnosis is the process o f explaining why the behavior of a system deviates from the 
expected behavior. Such diagnoses are the answers to the questions “Why has my watch stopped?” 
and "Why were the lights llickering after yesterday’s storm?” Fault examples include a broken 
spring, a dead battery, a leak in a fuel line, etc. The task of diagnosis presents particular challenges 
such as identifying the faulty component, taking into consideration fault propagation, and account­
ing for multiple faults.
A number of systems have been developed to deal with these problems. Such systems fall into two 
categories. Associational or shallow-reasoning systems are systems that do diagnosis based on 
predefined links between sets o f symptoms and pre-existing explanations [Buchanan & Shortliffe 
1984]. These systems arc fast but inflexible, since their lack of deep domain knowledge makes 
them incapable of dealing with problems outside their preset rule bases. First-principle or deep- 
reasoning systems use causal reasoning to produce explanations for the set of symptoms [Davis 
1984]. These systems are more flexible, but are slower, since they must derive each new diagnosis 
from the underlying model.
In maintenance diagnosis, i.e. diagnosis of physical systems not in operation, it is sufficient to 
identify the source of the problem (faulty component) in order to determine which component(s) 
need to be repaired. In domains where the system is in continuous operation, however, it is desir­
able that the system operators be aware of fault consequences in order to facilitate corrective 
actions. A pilot who observes abnormal behavior in the plane’s sensor values needs to know not 
only what the fault is, but also how the fault will propagate and what its subsequent effects will be.
Automating the process of predicting the future behavior of physical systems is a difficult task 
because physical faults manifest themselves in various ways and it is difficult to enumerate all pos­
sible consequences. Current efforts to incorporate prognostication features in diagnostic systems 
that reason from physical system models succeed in predicting the expected course of events but
- 5 -
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are limited by the level of detail of their models [Feyock & Karamouzis 1991]. For example, a 
model-based reasoning system that has a model o f an airplane’s functional and physical connec­
tions among components may, after establishing that the fan in the left engine is the faulty compo­
nent, predict that the fault will affect the operation of the compressor since there is a functional 
link between the two components. Such a system is incapable, however, o f deducing that flying 
fragments from the faulty fan may penetrate the fuselage and damage the right engine. Humans, on 
the other hand, are good at making such predictions, since their reasoning is based not only on pre­
existing models o f the world, but also on previous directly or vicariously experienced events 
which remind them of die current situation.
1.2 Approach
This thesis presents a novel approach to dealing with physical systems while operating. The meth­
odology presented here involves the use of case-based techniques in conjunction with models that 
describe the physical system. Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) systems solve new problems by find­
ing solved problems similar to the current problem, and by adapting solutions to the current prob­
lem, taking into consideration any differences between the current and previously solved 
situations. Because CBR systems associate features of a problem with a previously-derived solu­
tion to that problem, they arc classified as associalional-reasoning systems.
We show a case-based reasoning methodology for fault diagnosis and prognosis of physical sys­
tems in operation. This methodology employs a hybrid reasoning process based on a library o f pre­
vious cases and a model of the physical system that is used as basis for the reasoning process. This 
arrangement provides the methodology with the flexibility and power of first-principle reasoners,
- 6 -
1 CBR and Physical Systems 12  Approach
coupled with the speed of associations systems. Although domain independent, this work is tested 
in the aircraft domain.
In contrast to other CBR research efforts, each case in this methodology is not only a set of previ­
ously observed symptoms, but also represents sequences of events over a certain time interval. 
Such temporal information is necessary when reasoning about operating physical systems, since 
the set of symptoms observed at a particular time may represent improvement or deterioration 
from a previous observation, or may reveal valuable fault propagation information. In a jet engine, 
for example, the fact that the fan rotational speed was observed to be abnormal prior to an abnor­
mal observation of the compressor rotational speed is indicative that the faulty component is the 
fan and that the fault propagated to the compressor, rather than the reverse.
The model represents the rcasoner’s knowledge of causal relationships between states and observ­
able symptoms, as well as deep domain knowledge such as functional and physical connections 
among the components of the physical system about which the reasoner must reason. This 
research alleviates die knowledge acquisition problem to which current model-based systems are 
subject by letting each case of the CBR reasoning mechanism contribute its causal explanation, 
gained from adapting previous incidents, to the formation and maintenance of the causality model. 
The model can therefore be considered as a general depository o f knowledge accumulated through 
time. In return the model aids the matching and adaptation processes of the CBR reasoning mech­
anism.
- 7 -
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1.3 Methodology
The described research integrates case-based and model-based reasoning techniques for dealing 
with physical system faults. In order to demonstrate the challenges and benefits of such work a 
prototypical system is being designed and implemented in the aircraft domain. The system con­
tains a self-oiganizing memory, as defined by [Shank 1982], for storing previously encountered 
problems. Each case lias been represented in a memory organization packet (MOP) as imple­
mented in [Riesbcck & Schank 1989].
Each case represents an actual aircraft accident case and consists of a set of features that identify 
the particular accident, a set of observable symptoms, and a causal explanation that describes the 
relationship between various states and observable features. The set of identifying features 
includes information such as aircraft type, airline, flight number, date of the accident, etc. The set 
of symptoms includes information about abnormal observations from mechanical sensors or 
“human sensors” such as the value o f the exhaust gas temperature, the value of engine pressure 
ratio, the sound of an explosion, or the smell of smoke in the passenger cabin. These symptoms are 
presented in groups, each group representing a particular time interval. These time intervals are of 
unknown and uneven length; it is their ordering that it is o f importance.
Additionally, the system incorporates a model, called the world knowledge model, that consists of 
deep domain information such as the physical and functional dependencies between the compo­
nents o f the physical system, and causal information describing the transitions between various 
states of the physical system. Along with the causal information between two states, e.g. “ineffi­
cient air flow” and “slowing do ton of the engine,” the model maintains a frequency count of the 
number o f times that the system witnessed that inefficient air flow caused the engine to slow down. 
The physical and functional connections arc represented using LIMAP, a matrix-based knowledge
- 8 -
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representation tool [Feyock & Karamouzis 1992], and include information of the type "the Fan is 
connected to sensor N1 via a functional link,” “the Fan is physically connected to die compressor.” 
LIM AP provides an excellent tool for queries such as:
• “Is there a connection between the combustor and the turbine?"
“If there is a connection, what kind of connection is it?”
"Give me all the paths by which the turbine can be reached form the compressor.”
The causality knowledge of the world model includes information such as “fan-blade separation 
causes the rotational speed of the fan to fluctuate” and “the rotational speed of the fan causes the 
engine pressure ratio to fluctuate.”
When the system experiences a new set of symptoms it searches its case library for the most simi­
lar case. Based on Hie observation that similar faults manifest themselves in similar ways only dur­
ing the first moments of the fault occurrence [AAIB-AAR-4/90], the system developed takes 
advantage o f the available temporal information in each case, and tries to establish similarity 
based on the observable symptoms during the first moments of the fault occurrence. The input 
cases do not have to match exactly any previous cases in memory.
If the system finds and retrieves a similar case, the causal explanation of the retrieved case is 
adapted to fit the current case, and is stored in the case library for future usage. The system is pro­
vided with a set of adaptation rules which, in addition to adapting the retrieved causal explanation 
to fit the current case, find possible gaps in the causal explanation and fill in the missing causali­
ties. This causal explanation connects the symptoms to a justifying cause, and thus the system’s 
causal reasoning ability produces a causal analysis of the new case, rather than simply a reference 
to a previous solution. The new causal analysis is not only be stored in the case library as part of 
the input case, but is used to augment and modify the causality knowledge of the world model. 
The causal analysis will consist of a sequence of pairs of the type “event A causes event B,” “event 
B causes event C" and so on. Each of these pairs is stored in the causality section of the model. In
- 9 -
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the case that the model already knows about the causal relation between two events from a previ­
ously seen case, the system updates the frequency count between the two events. The world model 
is therefore created based on the previous behavior o f the physical system, and is constantly 
updated based on the current behavior, either by augmenting its previous causa! knowledge or 
“becoming more sure” about causal relations.
Constant consultation o f the model gives the system its prognostication ability. For example, hav­
ing achieved a match of the current situation with a previous case where the faulty component was 
a bad fuel controller, the system hypothesizes that the same fault is occurring. By referencing the 
world model it is able to predict that an engine flameout may occur, although that did not happen 
in the retrieved case, because the model may have recorded at least one previous instance where 
this happened. The operator is provided with a list of possible consequences o f the fault along with 
a frequency count of each one. Figure 1.1 is a diagram o f the various modules involved in the rea­
soning system along with their interactions.
1.4 Results
Empirical testing of the methodology has lead to the following conclusions:
• Combining a memory of past cases with models combines the efficiency of associational 
reasoning with the flexibility o f model-based reasoning.
• The integration of CBR and models enhances the ability of the model-based component 
by the CBR component’s capacity to contribute new links into the causality model. The 
adaptation rules o f  the CBR component not only adapt the retrieved causal explanation to
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LIBRARY CASE LIBRARY CASE
Id Features Id Features
Symptoms Symptoms
Causal Explanations Causal Explanations
INPUT CASE
Id Features 
Symptoms
•  •
LIBRARY CASE
Id Features 
Symptoms 
Causal Explanations
WORLD KNOWLEDGE MODEL
C a u s a l i t y  K n o w l e d g e  
F u n c t i o n a l  K n o w l e d g e  
P h y s i c a l  C o n n e c t i o n s  K n o w l e d g e
Figure 1.1: Models of the reasoning system and their interactions
fit the current case, but they find possible gaps in the causal explanation and fill in the 
missing causalities. These additional causalities serve in the causal explanation of the cur­
rent case and to expand the available knowledge to the model.
The integration of CBR and models enhances the ability o f the CBR component by using
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the model to aid the processes of matching, and adaptation. The model aids matching and 
adaptation in dealing with features which appear different on a superficial level, but are 
accounted for by the same initial cause.
• The use of the causality model provides enhanced fault-propagation forecast capabilities 
to the reasoner. The nature of the causality model (viewed as central depository) enables 
the reasoner to predict beyond the experiences of the retrieved case to the experiences 
accumulated by all previous cases.
1.5 Comparison to Other Work
Combined CBR and model-based reasoning (MBR) has been used primarily in engineering 
design. In the design domain a case consists of a design goal, a set of specifications for that goal, a 
set o f constraints that must be met, and a plan for achieving the goal. CBR systems in this domain 
are faced with the challenge of using previous design plans in order to come up with a new design 
plan.
Recognizing the advantages of combining CBR and MBR, [Sycara & Navichandra 1989; Goel 
1989; Goel & Cliandrasckaran 1989] use device models in order to adapt old design cases. The 
fact that two design problems with different features might represent the same object if the fea­
tures are studied based on their structural, functional, and causal behavior inspired them to use 
models to define the similarity between the two design problems.
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Goel and Chandrasckaran [Gocl and Chandrasekaran 1989] represent devices by a high-level 
model, called afunctional representation, that describes the expected and unexpected behavior of 
the system. In contrast to our work their models are case specific and they don’t use a causality 
model. Sycara and Navinchandra [Sycara and Navinchandra 1989] have proposed the use of 
causal models for adapting design cases in engineering domain. Apart from the differences in the 
task and the domain, their method differs from our work in that they use only causal models that 
contain no domain information on either the function nor the structure of the system. More impor­
tantly, Goel and Chandrasckaran along with Sycara and Navinchandra demonstrated how models 
may be used to aid case-based reasoning when dealing with devices that are not in operation. 
Dealing with devices that are in operation, as is done in our work, provides additional challenges 
since temporal information must be taken in to account. Our work explicitly represents and rea­
sons about time when dealing with physical systems.
Although current CBR systems are goal-oriented and used mainly in planning, design, and mem­
ory organization, there is some work in the diagnostic domain. [Kolodner & Kolodner 1987J 
developed a diagnostic CBR system which reasons in the domain of medicine. Their system is 
more an application of dynamic memory as defined by [Schank 1982] than a diagnostic system. It 
organizes memory using Diagnostic MOP’s and Process MOPs. Diagnostic MOPs are dynamic 
structures, updated from experience, that represent disease categories; Process MOPs are special­
ized structures that offer a predefined way to organize memory.
[Koton 1988] has combined model-based reasoning and CBR in medical diagnosis in a system 
called CASEY, which is based on a self-organizing memory for storing previously seen cases. 
Each case is comprised o f a patient description and solution data. The patient description includes
signs and symptoms, test results, history, and current therapy information. The solution data 
includes a causal explanation of the symptoms, together with therapy recommendations. When the
- 1 3 -
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system is presented with a new patient description it attempts to retrieve a similar case and adapt 
the solution data of the retrieved case to fit the current patient description. If no acceptable previ­
ous case is found the system gives control to a model-based reasoning system called the Heart 
Failure Program. This program utilizes a network of causalities between various physiological 
states, and produces a causal explanation which describes the relationship between physiological 
states and observable features. Even when the CBR portion of CASEY is successful in producing 
a causal explanation of the observable features the user has the option of running the Heart Failure 
program. Although CASEY’s CBR portion handles learning by storing newly created causal 
explanations in the case library, it has no provision of updating the causality model kept in the 
Heart Failure program. The model is therefore static, since it depends solely on a predefined cau­
sality network. In contrast to CASEY our work includes the provision o f dynamically creating and 
maintaining the model from the set of previous behaviors of the physical system.
CASEY’s algorithm includes the following stages [Koton 1989]:
• The phase of retrieval where CASEY retrieves from its case library a case similar to the 
new patient
• The phase of justification where CASEY evaluates the significance of any differences 
between the new case and the retrieved case using a set of principles for reasoning about 
evidence in causal explanations. These principles are used to: determine whether a feature 
in the retrieved case is ruled out by evidence in the input case; show that feature differ­
ences are insignificant or repairable; disregard differences in features that describe normal 
states, states from which no information is available or states that describe behavior with 
in the same qualitative region. If all differences between the new case and the retrieved
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• case are judged insignificant or if Uie solution can be repaired to account for them, the 
match is said to be justified.
• The phase of adaptation. If none of the differences rule out the retrieved case, causal 
repair strategies arc used to adapt the previous case’s causal explanation to the new case. 
These causal repair strategies add or remove nodes and links to the transferred causal 
explanation. If all matches arc ruled out, or if  no similar previous case is found, CASEY 
uses the Heart Failure program to produce a solution.
* The storage phase where the new case and its solution are stored in the case library for use 
in future problem solving. Indexing is done using every feature that describes the case and 
does not discriminate significant or predictive features. In contrast, our work utilizes an 
indexing scheme which is based on assigning various weights on features that reflect the 
diagnostic importance of each feature.
[Hammond & Hurwitz 1988] report research in the domain o f reasoning about physical systems. 
When given a case describing a fault together with its explanation, their system uses this explana­
tion and a predefined causality structure of the domain to decide which features o f the fault should 
be indexed. Their work docs not include deep domain models that describe the structural and func­
tional connections of the physical system, and targets the extraction of diagnostic features for stor­
ing cases, rather than pcrfonning complete reasoning about physical system faults. The importance 
of their contribution in the area of reasoning about physical systems lies in the development and 
use o f a simple but powerful set o f heuristics concerning causal relatedness in physical systems. 
These heuristics arc used to evaluate the likelihood that two features are causally related in the 
event that the system’s causal model is unaware of a causal chain between them. For example, dirt 
and grass covering a lawn mower may be predictive of a plugged air filter while a bent handlebar 
probably is not - although in neither case does there exist a direct causal chain from the failure to
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the feature. Their diagnostic algorithm is a variation o f the one used for case-based planning 
[Hammond 86] and includes the following steps:
• The phase of selection where given an input case the observable features of the case are 
used to find similar cases in the case library. One of these cases is selected as the one that 
matches the best with the input case.
• The phase of matching where portions of the retrieved causal explanation are matched 
against features of the input case. By examining the status of the physical system further 
matches arc done.
• The phase of modification where any deviations from the retrieved causal explanation are 
repaired using backward chaining and the causal relatedness heurisdes.
• The phase of connection categorizes features into those that are explained by the normal 
use o f the physical system, those that are explained by the causal chain leading to the fail­
ure, and those that remain unexplained. Features in the first category are connected into a 
model that describes the actions that are performed on and with the system, and features in 
the second category are connected in the causal explanation of the failure.
• Extraction is the phase where the features that are causally related to the failure form the 
list o f candidate features for indexing. The unexplained features and the features that are 
explained by the normal use of the system are ignored.
• During the phase o f indexing the input case is stored in the memory, indexed by the fea­
tures that predict its applicability. These index features are comprised by those features
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• that must be present in any instance of the diagnosed problem and those features that 
might be causally related, as determined by the relatedness heuristics.
[Turner 1988] reports research which presents an approach to diagnostic reasoning called schema- 
based reasoning (SBR), which allows a reasoner to access and use the most specific procedural 
information available for the problem at hand. By using schema-like information, the reasoner can 
bring specialized problem-solving procedures to bear on diagnostic problems. His ideas are dem­
onstrated in MEDIC, an SBR diagnostic reasoner whose domain is pulmonology. MEDIC’s mem­
ory is an interconnected set of discrimination nets, or hierarchies, in which the leaf nodes are cases 
and scenes, and the interior nodes are MOPs or schemata. T im er's work is more an application of 
memory organization than a diagnostic system. Because MEDIC does not allow cases of problem 
solving to be added to its memory in a manner implemented in every traditional CBR system, it is 
incapable o f learning.
In contrast with our research, all of the CBR work mentioned in this section is reflected on specific 
applications with no foundations on any theoretical base. Formalizing the case-based reasoning 
paradigm is the major contribution of this work to the future CBR research efforts. Additionally, 
unlike other work, our research demonstrates the challenges of explicitly representing and reason­
ing about time. This is an important attribute in the diagnostic task since observed symptoms at a 
particular time may represent improvement or worsening due to the system's behavior at a previ­
ous time.
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“Those who cannot remember the past 
are condemned to repeat it."
— Santayana
“I have but one lamp by which my feet are guided, 
and that is the lamp of experience.
I know no way of judging of the future but by the past.”
— Patrick Henry
Chapter 2
Case-Based Reasoning
2.1 Case-Based Reasoning Paradigm
The basic cycle of a CBR system is “input a problem, find a relevant old solution, adapt it." When 
a problem is input to a CBR system, an analysis, performed by the system, determines the features 
relevant to finding similar cases. These features are called indices. Relevance is usually deter­
mined not by the obvious features of the input problem, but by abstract relations between features, 
absence of features, and so on. The problem of determining what extra, non-obvious features are 
needed for a particular domain is called the indexing problem.
Usually the indexes retrieve a set o f potentially relevant old cases. The next step is to match the 
previous cases against the input and reject cases that are dilferent from the input and determine 
which of the retrieved cases is the most similar. This similarity of cases is determined by how well 
they match on each feature, and how important each feature is. For example, when the visitor in 
Athens is confronted with die situation of using a bus, a previous experience of using the subway 
in Athens, and an experience of using the bus in London may be retrieved as relevant cases. Fol­
lowing a careful evaluation of the important features in each case the visitor may consider that his 
bus experience in London is more closely related to the current situation. In the current situation, a 
location match is considered of lesser importance than the type o f the desired means of transporta­
tion, therefore the London experience forms the best match.
After a best match is determined it must be adapted to fit the current situation. During the adapta­
tion process it must be determined what is different between the input and the retrinved best
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match, and then the solution associated with the retrieved case must be modified to take into 
account those differences. The modified solution becomes the solution of the input situation. How 
much adaptation needs to be done depends on the nature of the differences. In our example, very 
little adaptation must be done in the process o f recognizing an Athenian bus since its differences 
with a bus in London arc minor, but more adaptation has to be done in the process of getting a 
ticket if the experience of using the subway in Athens was the best match in the situation o f using 
a bus in Athens. The following sections investigate with more detail the various phases of the CBR 
paradigm along with the structures used for organizing the memory.
2.1.1 Memory Organization
In the early 80’s [Schank 1982] developed knowledge structures for organizing memory called 
Memory Organization Packages (MOPs). These structures involve standard AI concepts, such as 
frames, abstraction, inheritance, and so on. MOPs are used to represent knowledge about classes 
o f complicated events and contain a set of norms which represent the basic features of a MOP, 
such as: what events occur, what goals are accomplished, what actors are involved, and so on. For 
example, the following two MOPs describe an event between Tim and David, and the outcome o f 
the event:
fight-event-mop fight-outcome-mop
ACTION stab-mop STATE dead-mop
ACTOR tim-mop ACTOR david-mop
OBJECT david-mop
FREQ scvcral-times-mop
Similar knowledge structures for organizing memory, called scripts, were developed by [Schank 
& Abelson 1977]. Scripts differ from MOPs because they are not organized into interlinked net­
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works as MOPs. Additionally, scripts are static knowledge structures, but MOPs are used to form 
dynamically changing knowledge bases, i.e., systems that learn new knowledge in the process of 
understanding and problem solving. During the same time that scripts were proposed, [Minsky 75] 
proposed frames, which are analogous structures and at that time were used in the domain of 
visual processing.
A MOP that refers to an instance rather than a category is called an instance MOP. MOPs are 
joined together with links. [Riesbeck & Schank 1989] classify links into the following categories:
a. A MOP may be joined to a more specific version of itself. The specific version is called a 
specialization and the more general MOP is called an abstraction. The link that joins a 
specification and an abstraction is called an abstraction link. A network of MOPs, going 
from very specific instances at the bottom to very abstract general knowledge at the top, is 
called an abstraction hierarchy. In an abstraction hierarchy the features of each MOP are 
inherited by the MOPs below it. For example, if we represent the process o f “getting a 
Ph.D. in computer science” in a MOP, then this MOP can be linked via an abstraction link 
to a MOP that represents the process of “getting a doctoral degree.”
b. MOPs that represent events have scene links to various sub-events. The network of MOPs 
linked together by scene links is called the packaging hierarchy. In our example, passing 
an oral examination could be a scene in the “getting a doctoral degree" MOP.
c. In some systems a MOP may be linked to those instances from which the MOP was origi­
nally derived, or to prototypical examples of the MOP. These links are called exemplar 
links.
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d. A MOP may be linked to instances of the MOP that involved an expectation failure via 
failure links. In our example, the “getting a doctoral degree" MOP may be linked to a par­
ticular instance MOP that describes the unsuccessful effort of a certain student to get a 
doctoral degree because he performed poorly in the required course-work.
e. Links that join a MOP with its specializations are called index links. Each index link is 
labeled with an allribule-value pair. These pairs of attributes and values are not features 
for the MOP. When a MOP is indexed by such a pair, then the pair automatically becomes 
a feature of the MOP and every other MOP under this MOP inherits this feature. In our 
example, "area of study” is an attribute and "Computer Science” a possible value. The 
index link “area of study = computer science” would link the “getting a doctoral degree” 
MOP with the “getting a Ph.D. in computer science” MOP. The network of MOPs that is 
formed by the index links is called the discrimination net.
Not every Case-Based Reasoner makes use o f all of these kinds of links. For example, a,Case- 
Based Reasoner that needs to classify hardware based on their CPU type may use abstractions 
instead of index links. This can be done by creating a set o f abstraction MOPs under the hardware- 
type MOP, where each abstraction has only one slot, namely the slot for CPU type. Then the rea­
soner can put each particular hardware piece under the appropriate abstraction. The use of abstrac­
tions in this manner would subdivide the memory in the same way that it would be subdivided if 
the reasoner was to use index links such as “CPU type = <some_type>."
Organizing memory in abstraction hierarchies is a key characteristic of CBR systems that leads to 
efficient retrieval of previous cases. Case-based Reasoning systems that use MOPs to hierarchi­
cally organize their memory constantly add new instances, new abstractions, or new indexes. New 
instances are added during normal use of MOP memory for solving problems. These instances 
record experiences in terms of MOPs.
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Additional knowledge may be recorded by creating abstractions. A simple approach for creating 
abstractions is a method called similarity-based generalization, where the formation of abstrac­
tions is done when a number of cases are discovered to share a common set of features. These 
common features are used to create the features of the new abstracted MOPs, and the unshared 
features are used as indexes to the original MOPs. A potential problem with similarity-based gen­
eralization is that it may fonn spurious generalizations until the case library is sufficiently large.
An approach that avoids this problem is Explanation-based Generalization (EBG) [Mitchell 1986; 
DeJong and Mooney, 1986]. In this method abstractions are made only when a plausible reason for 
their existence can be inferred, based on prior causal knowledge. The problem with systems that 
employ EBG is that they can end up doing a lot of w ork to create an abstraction for one-time only 
event [Simpson 1985; Sycara 1987; Hammond 1988] employ a form of EBG called failure-driven 
learning, where in addition to the solutions the reasoner saves general explanations o f why some 
solutions don’t work.
2.1.2 Indexing
Retrieving relevant cases from memory can be a massive search problem. In order to make the 
retrieval process more selective and reduce the effect o f  memory size cases must be indexed by 
appropriate features. Throughout the literature there are several approaches involving the selection 
of an appropriate set of indices. The easiest approach is to use as indices all the features that form 
the description of a case. [Lcbowitz 1987] uses inductive learning to determine relevant features 
which in return become indices. [Mark & Barletta 1988] use explanation-based techniques to iden­
tify predictive features for each case so they can serve as indices.
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Although there are several context-dependent methods for selecting indices, there is a need for 
more study of this process, especially on methods for generating new indices dynamically.
2.1.3 Retrieval
Retrieval of relevant cases is one of the most crucial issues in CBR. Because most of the complex, 
real-world domains involve thousands o f cases, the process of retrieving cases from memory 
becomes a massive search problem. The situation is complicated by the fact that we must perform 
some type of partial matching because an input case is unlikely to match exactly a previously 
stored case. Retrieval techniques depend on the structure o f case memory, the information stored 
in each case, the features used as indices, the notions of similarity and relevance, and the available 
general knowledge about the domain.
To avoid exhaustive search, CBR search methods depend on a memory being organized in abstrac­
tion hierarchies. The search starts at the most general MOP in the abstraction hierarchy and pro­
ceeds downward only when a match is achieved at an abstraction MOP. Instance cases are 
therefore retrieved only when their abstractions match. Tb illustrate how this search works we 
present the following example in the domain of computer hardware. Let us assume that each com­
puter system can be described in terms of three components: llie type of the CPU, the type o f the 
CRT, and the type of the keyboard.
Figure 2.1 on page 26 presents a snapshot o f the reasoner’s memory organization and we assume 
that the reasoner contains domain specific knowledge such as the fact that a 286 CPU is a CPU in 
the Intel family, a CPU in the Intel family is a CISC CPU, a CISC CPU is a single CPU, a CGA 
CRT is a color CRT, a color CRT is a CRT, a standard keyboard is a keyboard etc. We assume that 
an new computer comes and the task of the reasoner is to find the computers that are similar. The
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first component in the new computer is a 286 CPU, the second component a CGA CRT, and the 
third a standard keyboard. Note that the new computer is been represented in a MOP that contains 
three features, one for each component. Then the search proceeds in the following way:
COMPUTERS
SP COMPUTERS PARALLEL COMPUTERS
Compl Single_CPU C om pl Mtilt_CPU
Com pl CPU 
Comp2 CPU 
Comp3 Kbrd
WORKSTATIONS PERSONAL COMPUTERS
C om pl RJSC_CPU 
Com p2 ColorjCPU  
Com p3 Extd_Kbrd
C om pl CISC CPU
MACs DOS COMPUTERS
C om pl Motorola Com pl Intel Family
COMPUTER #33 COMPUTER #34
Compl 486sx Com pl 386D X
Comp2 Super_VGA Comp2 CGA
Figure 2.1: Snapshot of Case-Based Reasoner's memory orgainzation
Step 1: First level (lop level) comparison. Each component that describes the new computer is 
been compared with the corresponding component that describes computers in general. Since a
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286 CPU is a kind of CPU then we say that the value of the feature componentl in the MOP that 
describes the new computer satisfies the constrain imposed by the feature componentl in the MOP 
that describe computers in general. This constrain is the fact that componentl must be a CPU. 
Similarly because a CGA CRT is a CRT, and a standard keyboard is a keyboard then we say that 
the MOP New_Computcr satisfies the MOP Computer and we move to the second step.
Step 2: Second level comparison. Each component that describes the new computer is been com­
pared with the corresponding component that describes single processing computers (SP_Comput- 
ers MOP). A 286 CPU is a single CPU thus the feature componentl in the New_Computer MOP 
satisfies the feature componentl in the SP_Computers MOP. The latter contains no componentl, 
and component2 features thus these feature are inherited from the Computers MOP Both of these 
feature are also satisfied by the corresponding features in the New_Computer MOP thus we move 
to the lower level under the SP_Computers MOP.
Step 3: Third level comparison. A CGA CRT is a Color CRT but a 286 CPU is not a RISC CPU 
thus the New_Computcr MOP does not satisfy the constraints imposed by the Workstations MOP. 
Nest the New_Computcr MOP is been compared with the Personal_Computers MOP. The latter 
inherits the values for componentl, and component2 features from the SP_Computers MOP. A 
286 CPU is a CISC CPU thus the Personal_Computers MOP is satisfied and the search continues 
with its children.
Step 4: Fourth level comparison. The New_Computers MOP can not satisfy the constraints of the 
MACs MOP but it does satisfy the DOS_Computers MOP thus the search continues with the chil­
dren of that MOP.
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Step 5: Retrieval. Since ihc children of the DOS_Computers MOP are instances o f particular 
computers then these are retrieved as the computers that are similar to the new computer.
Earlier retrieval implementations [Kolodner 1983; Lebowitz 1983] use of redundant discrimina­
tion networks in order to guide the search, but later implementations [Kolodner 1988] used memo­
ries with distributed representations where cases were stored in pieces.
Along with the issue o f  reaching relevant cases the reasoner must face the problem o f choosing 
one o f the retrieved cases, the one that matches “best” the input case. The chosen case, called 
most-on-point, should be the one that addresses the reasoner’s current problem in the best way. 
There are several approaches to this problem. The simplest tactic would be to accumulate a 
(weighted) count of the number o f matching features between each retrieved case and the input 
case. While this may work in some domains, it is inappropriate for most domains since the impor­
tance o f  each feature is context dependent. [Kolodner 88] employs a method based on preference 
heuristics. [Rissland & Ashley 88] use the method o f dimensional analysis. In the domain of legal 
reasoning they have developed special knowledge structures called dimensions which identify a 
factual feature that links operative facts to known legal approaches to those facts, specify which 
are the most important for this approach, and specify how a legal positions strength or weakness 
can be compared to other cases. [Stanfill 87] uses dynamically changing weighted evaluation func­
tions. In all of these methods the common aspect is that all of the retrieved relevant cases are taken 
in consideration in choosing what is important for choosing the most-on-point case.
2.1.4 Adaptation
After the retriever finds the best match that it can in memory, the system proceeds to adapt the 
solution stored in the retrieved case to the need o f the current situation. The adaptation process
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looks for salient differences between the retrieved case and the input and then applies rules that 
take those differences into account. Those adaptation rules can be much simpler than those 
required by a purely rule-based system. In a planning domain the adaptation rules note precondi­
tions to steps that need to be met and suggest plans to achieve these preconditions. In a diagnostic 
task, the adaptation rules And gaps in an causal explanation and fill in the missing causalities.
A CBR system can get by with a much weaker set of adaptation rules, if  the case library is broad 
enough. The process by which most people learned to find logarithms in high school demonstrates 
how a bigger case library can allow the use of significantly weaker adaptation rules and still get 
strong results. In the process of finding logarithms, the table of logarithms is analogous to the case 
libraiy. Looking up the closest numbers is case retrieval and interpolating the answers using ratios 
is the adaptation rule. This simple rule yields reasonable answers only if  the table has two numbers 
close to our number.
Types of Adaptation
[Riesbeck & Schank 89] describe two types of adaptation. Structural adaptation is the process of 
applying the adaptation rules directly to the solution stored in the retrieved case. [Hammond 88] 
uses it in the domain of cooking to modify previous recipes in order to come up with a new recipe, 
and [Bain 86] in the domain of legal reasoning in order to modify prior criminal cases.
The second type is derivational adaptation, where the rules that generated the solution in the 
retrieved case are re-run to generate the solution in the input case. Systems that use derivational 
adaptation store not only a solution with each case, but the planning sequence that constructed that 
solution [Simpson 1985]. An advantage of derivational adaptation is that requires fewer ad hoc
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rules [Hammond 1989]. Additionally, it can be used to adapt problem solving knowledge from 
other domains, rather than being restricted to within-domain solutions [Simpson 1985].
Using a particular type o f adaptation does not imply exclusion of the other type. In reality CBR 
systems should have both structural adaptation rules to fix the “non-analyzed” solution, and deri­
vational mechanisms to fix cases that are well understood by the systems. For example, solutions 
generated by the system itself are ideal for derivational adaptation.
Adaptation Techniques
The simplest adaptation technique is to do nothing and simply apply the solution o f the retrieved 
case to the new situation. This is called null adaptation and comes up in tasks where, even though 
the reasoning to a solution may be complex, the solution itself is very simple. For example, when 
evaluating loan applications many factors must be considered, but the final answer is either accept 
or reject. Considering the fact that the real solution stored in each case is the chain o f  reasoning 
leading to a particular answer, the disadvantage of null adaptation is that does not provide to the 
user information such as how a particular answer was derived, what other answers are possible, 
and so on.
Parameterized solutions is another technique where given an input situation and the retrieved 
case, the retrieved and new problem descriptions are compared along the specified parameters. 
The solutions are then used to modify the solution parameters in the appropriate directions [Riss- 
Iand and Ashley 1986; Bain 1986; Sycara 1987; Hammond 1989]. This technique is of value in 
modifying an existing solution, not creating a solution from scratch. It is a simple and powerful 
way to augment a case library, but is not a replacement for a good set o f cases.
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Abstraction and respecialization is a structural adaptation technique where, if  a piece of the 
retrieved solution does not apply to the problem at hand, the system looks for abstractions of that 
piece of the solution that do not have the same difficulty. Then it tries to apply other specializa­
tions of the abstraction to the current situation [Alterman 1986; Kass 1986; Sycara 1987].
[Sussman 1975] proposed the notion of critics as a debugging tool for nearly correct solutions. His 
proposal was implemented in [Simmons 1988]. A critic looks for some combination o f features 
that can cause a problem in a plan. Associated with different problems are strategies for repair. The 
feature combinations that arc worth checking depends on how the plans are derived. In Sussman’s 
work, a plan for achieving several goals simultaneously is derived by putting together plans that 
could achieve each goal independently. The critics then check if any plans interfered with each 
other, or if  any plans are redundant. Critics as used in CBR systems can make only local changes 
to solutions, rather than globally reorganizing everything [Sycara 1987; Hammond 1989].
Reinstantiation is a derivational adaptational technique which operates not on the solution of the 
retrieved case, but on the method that was used to generate that solution [Simpson 1985; Ham­
mond 1989]. Reinstantiation means replacing a step in a solution by taking the plan that generated 
that step and rerunning it in the context of the current situation. Since reinstantiating a plan is plan­
ning, the power of this technique is limited by the planning power of the reasoner.
2.1.5 Testing
As soon as the adapted solution becomes the solution of the input case, most CBR systems pass 
the solution through a tester. Tills phase is important in domains such as planning or legal reason­
ing where there is no unique '‘right” answer. One way to test the new solutions is by proposing 
hypothetical and counterexamples to test the robustness of the solution. Another way is to use the
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new solution as a probe into memory and try to find similar instances in the case library that lead 
to failure. Both methods are case-based, since they have to go into the case library and try to 
retrieve some other case. [Hammond 88] in the domain of planning employs simulation for test­
ing. The idea is to pass the solution through a simulator and check the results of the simulation 
against the results from die CBR system.
2.1.6 Failure Explanation
Reasoning systems may fail at the testing phase when generating plans or do diagnoses, either 
because goals specified in the input are not achieved, or because implicit goals, not specified in the 
input, are violated. When a CBR reasoner fails, it has to explain its failure and repair it. In plan­
ning explanation comes before repair, and the repair is based on the explanation. In diagnosis, the 
repair has to come first.
The task of explanation is to generate a domain specific explanation o f why the proposed solution 
failed. In a planning domain the explanation is a causal chain leading from the steps in the plan to 
the violation of the goal [Hammond 1988]. In a fault diagnosis domain, the explanation is a causal 
chain leading from the failure of some component, other than the one diagnosed as faulty, to the 
observed fault symptoms.
2.1.7 Repair
Given a solution, a failure report, and possibly an explanation, the task o f repair is modification of 
the solution to remove the failure. In domains where explanation precedes repair, the explanation 
o f the failure will usually provide clues to the repairs needed. In other domains, such as fault diag­
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nosis, the only information available to the repair process is the diagnostic failure, i.e., “the com­
ponent selected as cause of failure is functional." In these domains one repair strategy is to add 
whatever new information is available in the failure report and then search the case library for 
another best match. If the additional information causes a different case to be retrieved, then it 
should be adapted. If the same case is retrieved as before, then an alternative repair strategy is to 
try adapting the second-best match.
Whenever solutions fail and are repaired it is important to link the solution that didn’t work with 
the one that finally did. This link will be useful when the same case fails to apply again, in some 
other situation. When this happens, the system can look at any other failures associated with this 
case and try to generalize what is common using either similarity-based or explanation-based gen­
eralization techniques. The goal is to find some characterization of the failing situations in order to 
avoid that class of failures in the future. For example, [Hammond 86] in the cooking domain 
employs a problem anticipation mechanism where the system (recipe planner), by noticing fea­
tures in the input case thal have previously contributed in past planning problems, anticipates 
planning problems in the current case. The fact that cooking beef and broccoli together makes the 
broccoli soggy, i.e., fails to achieve the goal of having a crisp vegetable, is worth remembering. 
Generalizing the failure into "cooking meat with a crisp vegetable makes the vegetable soggy” 
avoids subsequent failure when the system is asked to produce a recipe with chicken and snow- 
peas.
2.2 CBR versus Rule-Based Systems
CBR systems are an alternative to traditional Rule-Based (RB) systems. RB systems consist of a 
rule base of domain-specific knowledge, and a domain-independent rule interpreter that combines
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the rules to construct answers to problems [Buchanan & Shortliffe 1984], RB systems are divided 
into production systems which contain rules o f the form “IF some conditions are met THEN take 
some action”, and deductive systems which contain rules o f the form “IF some predicates are true, 
THEN conclude some other predicates are also true.”
RB systems are flexible and can produce nearly optimal solutions, but are slow and prone to 
errors. Ease o f adding a new rule or modifying an existing one is the major advantage of RB sys­
tems. RB systems are intuitive and better represent some kinds of knowledge that people seem to 
have. Rules capture “what to do knowledge" but not deep domain knowledge such as “why it 
works” o r “what it means” [Chandrasekaran & Mittal 1982], Another problem with RB systems is 
that the knowledge o f the system is scattered among individual pieces. Therefore the more facts 
the system knows the slower it becomes. A third problem is that rules are not good structures for 
representing events.
In contrast to RB systems, CBR systems are restricted to variations on known situations, and pro­
duce approximate solutions. In realistically complex domains are quick and their solutions are 
grounded in actual experience. Most importantly cases support knowledge transfer of expertise 
and explanation better than rules do. Because human expertise is more like a libraiy of past expe­
riences than like a set o f rules, using CBR systems makes the tasks of communicating expertise 
from domain experts to the system and justifying a solution from the system to domain experts 
much easier. Additionally, many real-world domains are so complex that it is impossible or 
impractical to always specify the rules that involved. By means o f cases we can always extract 
solutions, albeit approximate, to problems by retrieving a case that demonstrates some degree of 
similarity with the current problem.
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2.3 Prototypical CBR Systems
Since the early 80’s several reasoning systems have been constructed that can be considered to fol­
low the CBR paradigm. The following sections give a brief overview of exemplar CBR systems 
that demonstrate much of the work in the area, and have influenced the development of future sys­
tems.
2.3.1 IPP
IPP’s (Integrated Partial Parser) [Lebowitz 1980] domain is international terrorism, where it is 
able to read texts about terrorist activities, store its interpretations in memory, and make generali­
zations. IPP’s interesting characteristics include its memory structure, its rules for forming 
abstractions, and its use of memory to guide parsing. IPP is the first attempt at a computer system 
that uses dynamic memory structures (MOPs). Generalizations are made based on the assumption 
that similarities between the story being read and stories previously stored in memory represent 
generalizations that describe the world. These generalizations are used as a basis for organizing 
events and to guide future story understanding.
2.3.2 CYRUS
Along with IPP, CYRUS [Kolodner 1984] is another MOP-based story understanding system that 
focuses on how memory is used to answer questions after understanding. CYRUS’ domain is 
international politics. The system uses two databases, one for former Secretary of State Cyrus 
Vance and one for former Secretary of State Edmund Muskie. Following the basic cycle o f reading
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a story, storing its interpretations, and making generalizations, CYRUS is capable of answering 
questions such as "When did Vance meet Begin last?”, “Has Vance talked to Gromyko recently?”. 
CYRUS’ power is demonstrated in the process of answering questions such as “Did Vance met 
Mrs. Begin?”. Instead of performing the impossible tasks of exhaustive memory search or index­
ing every episode in advance under every possible question it answers the question by answering 
subsequent questions such as “When would Vance meet tire spouse of a diplomat?: At a state din­
ner”, “When would he go to a state dinner with Begin?”, and so on.
2.3.3 MEDIATOR
MEDIATOR [Simpson 1985] is the first CBR system in the domain o f dispute resolution. Given a 
conflict of goals between several parties and a MOP-based case library, it creates a new instance of 
a MOP to obtain some plan for resolving a dispute. Employing derivational adaptation, the system 
modifies previously stored plans in order to satisfy the current dispute. For example, when called 
to resolve the dispute between Egypt and Israel, it retrieved from memory a plan to settle a dispute 
between two children over the use of an orange. The retrieved case comprised o f a plan to give 
each child the part of the orange that she wanted: one wanted the peel while the other wanted the 
fruit. Adapting the retrieved solution MEDIATOR came up with a solution to give Israel military 
control, but to give Egypt political and economic control. In cases where the proposed dispute res­
olution fails to satisfy the involved parties, it employs a failure-driven learning mechanism by 
storing a record of the failure in order to predict and avoid such failures in the future.
2 Case-Based Reasoning
2.3.4 SWALE
2.3 Prototypical CBR Systems
The SWALE [Schank 86; Kass 86] system is a MOP-based explainer with a library of patterns for 
explaining why animals and people die. This library includes patterns such as old age, being run 
over by a car, and so on. When SWALE is given a death case which can not be explained by any of 
the normal explanation patterns, it searches its library for situations where the death pattern was 
abnormal. It then uses abstraction and respecialization to adapt (lie abnormal pattern to the current 
situation. For example, when SWALE was asked to explain the death of a healthy race horse, it 
found in its memory a case o f spouse killing spouse for life insurance, and reasoned that the 
healthy horse was killed by the owner for property insurance.
2.3.5 PLEXUS
Although PLEXUS’ [Altennan 1986] memory organization is not based on MOPs and its case 
library is trivial, its adaptation mechanism is of interest. PLEXUS uses abstraction and respecial­
ization to adapt previous plans for riding San Francisco’s subway into a plan for riding New 
York’s subway system. Initially PLEXUS uses null adaptation to adapt San Francisco’s plan but 
when pieces of the plan fail then the system employs abstraction and respecialization. For exam­
ple, San Francisco’s plan calls for getting a ticket from a machine but in New York there no ticket 
machines. The system abstracts from the concept of “get ticket from machine’’ to “get ticket”, then 
specializes to “get ticket from ticket booth,” as in the plan for going to a theater.
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JUDGE [Bain 1986] is a CBR system in the domain of “common-sense ethical reasoning” for 
criminal sentencing. The input is a description o f a criminal case, along with the chaige, the events 
that occurred, and the legal status regarding crimes of this nature. The case library contains previ­
ous crimes and the sentences determined for each. During its first stage of operation, JUDGE 
interprets the input case by inferring the seriousness of the crime, the motives of the actors in the 
current case, and determining the extent to which each offender was justified in acting violently, 
with the help o f interpretations assigned to previous cases. It follows a retrieval phase along with 
structural adaptation of previous sentences in order to ensure that diiferences in sentence severity 
between crimes corresponds to differences in heinousness of the crimes. At the end a generaliza­
tion phase forms sentencing rules when it finds it has several similar cases with similar sentences.
2.3.7 MBRtalk
MBRtalk [Stanfill & Waltz 1986] performs a word pronunciation task. By using a case library of 
several thousand words along with their pronunciations, it achieves 88% predictive accuracy in its 
task of mapping letters to phonemes. MBRtalk is a memory based system rather than a traditional 
CBR system. In contrast with CBR systems which employ search methods which depend on a 
memory being organized in abstraction hierarchies, MBRtalk deals with the entire memory. It 
relies on parallel architectures with enough processors to facilitate simultaneous search for a par­
tial match between the input word and every case in the memory. Selection is done by retrieving 
only the words that achieve some degree of partial match after the application o f an evaluation 
function to each word in the case library. A crucial issue in this reasoning scheme is the choice of 
the appropriate evaluation function that reflects the case selection.
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CHEF [Hammond 1988] is a case-based planner that builds new recipes out of its memory of old 
recipes. CHEF’s input is a set of goals for different tastes, textures, ingredients and types of dishes 
and its output is a plan, a single recipe, that satisfies all of the users goals. Much of CHEF’s plan­
ning power lies in its ability to predict and avoid failures it has encountered before. The following 
are the basic stages of a case-based planner such as CHEF. Problem anticipation is the stage in 
which the planner, by noticing features in the input case that have previously contributed in past 
planning problems, anticipates planning problems in the current case. During the stage of plan 
retrieval the most similar case with the input case is retrieved from memory. Plan modification is 
the stage where the plans of the retrieved case are adapted to satisfy the goals of the new case. 
Plan repair is the stage where in case of a plan failure the planner finds different strategies for 
repair by building a causal explanation of the failure. During the stage of credit assignment the 
planner uses a causal explanation of why a failure occurred in order to identify the features of the 
input case that led to the failure, and mark them as predictive features. At the final stage of plan 
storage plans are placed in the case memory, indexed by the goals that they satisfy and the prob­
lems that they avoid.
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Chapter 3
Formal Specifications
3.1 Rationale
In order to obtain a precise picture o f  the memory organization and various phases of the reasoning 
paradigm presented in this thesis we have developed a formal specification of the memory organi­
zation and various phases of this reasoning paradigm.
3.2 Models
The methodology presented in this thesis requires the availability and use of the following models: 
a functional dependency model, a physical dependency model, a causality model, and a manifesta­
tion model.
Let K , U, E, Y  be finite sets of abstract symbols where E c  U and Y  c  U. We give the following 
interpretation to these sets.
• K  as the set of components that comprise a physical system.
• U  as a set of phenomena, events, occurrences, or symptoms that can occur during the 
operation of a physical system.
• £  as a set of various events
• Y  as a the set of symptoms
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Components of a physical system may operate in two states: normal, and abnormal. Intuitively, a 
component k  is said to be in an abnormal state if the operational behavior of the component devi­
ates from the expected one. [We do not describe how component states are classified as normal or 
abnormal. We merely require that they be labelled one or the other.]
Definition 3.1: A dependency model (d-model) D is a relation on K, that is, K).
Given a d-model D on K  and components k\, k2 g K, we say k2 depends on or is dependent on k\ if 
(Jfcj, k2) g D. [Note the reversal of indices.]
We view a d-model as a directed graph with nodes connected by arrows. Each node is a member of 
K  and each edge represents a dependency (physical or functional) between the members of K. Intu­
itively a component k2 is physically dependent on component fcj if damage to k\ can propagate 
through space to k2. A component k2 is functionally dependent on component k\ if the operation of 
k2 depends on the operation of k\. [We do not describe how dependencies are classified as physical 
or functional. We merely require that they be labelled one or the other.]
Given a dependency, if the damage propagates instantaneously then the dependency is called an 
immediate dependence. If the damage requires an arbitrarily long time period to propagate, then 
the dependency is called a non-immediate dependence. [Again, we do not describe how dependen­
cies are classified as immediate or non-immediate. We merely require that they be labelled one or 
the other.]
Definition 3.2: A functional dependency model F  is a d-model containing only functional depen­
dencies.
3 Formal Specifications 3.2 Models
F  can be partitioned into two subsets F; and Fn i.e. F  = F (- u  Fn and F,- D F n = 0 .  F; and Fn repre­
sent functional dependencies that are immediate and non-immediate respectively.
Definition 3.3: A physical dependency model P is a d-model containing only physical dependen­
cies.
P can be partitioned into two subsets P; and P„ i.e. P  = Pj u  Pn and P-t D P n = 0 .  Pi and Pn repre­
sent physical dependencies that are immediate and non-immediate respectively.
Figure 3.1 shows the classification of dependency models:
dependencies
functionalphysical
non-immediatenon-immediate immediateimmediate
Figure 3.1: Gassification of dependencies
Definition 3.4: A causal model Z  is a relation on E, that is, Z g ( £ x £ ) ,
Given a causal model Z and events et , e2 e E, we say that e\ causes e2 if (ej, ef) eZ,
Definition 3 5 : A manifestation model 0  is a relation from K  to U, that is, ( KxU) .
Given a manifestation model <h, a component k <=K, and a phenomenon, event, occurrence, or 
symptom u <= U, we say that the component k has been observed to manifest itself as u if (k, u) e  O.
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This thesis presents a hybrid methodology for reasoning about physical systems in operation. This 
methodology is based on retrieval and adaptation o f previously experienced problems similar to 
the problem at hand. In this methodology the ability of the reasoner to reason about a physical sys­
tem is significantly enhanced by the addition and utilization of the four models defined in this sec­
tion. Section 3.3 presents a formalization of the Case-Based Reasoning paradigm and Section 3.4 
shows how the models are utilized in Case-Based Diagnosis.
3.3 Case-Based Diagnosis
The structures used by the majority o f CBR researchers are Memory Oiganization Packets (MOPs) 
as defined in [Schank 1982]. MOPs are frame-like structures that consist of attribute/value tuples 
called slots. The value o f a particular slot may be another MOP, etc. With MOPs the memory is 
partitioned in a hierarchical way so that MOPs are abstractions or specializations of other MOPs.
Definition 3.6: A case memory CM is a system (M, R, A, £2, ?, a ,  jLroot) satisfying:
• M  is a finite set of memory organi2ation packets (MOPs),
where K , U , E , Y ^ M
• R is a finite set o f  slot roles, satisfying M  n i !  = 0 ,
• A is a transitive, reflexive, antisymmetric relation on M, that is, A c  (M x  M). Further­
more, A must satisfy the abstraction constraint for certain of the MOPs in M. [See 
Definition 3.12.J
• £2, the null element, is an element where Q & M
• ?, the unsolved clement, is an element where ? <tM
• c  is a function o: M  -»  2<ff x M ' >, where M ' = M  u  {£2 , ?}, that satisfies the con-
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straint: V p e  Af, if (p, p j), (p, \1q) e  o(p), then p! = p2.
• p ^ , € M  satisfies: V p  e  Af, (p, p riW, ) e  A.
Note A is a partial order on M, and the partially ordered set (Af, A ) has \iroot as its maximal ele­
ment. A is called the abstraction relation, and the interpretation of (v, p) e  A is that p  is more 
abstract than v.
Definition 3.7: Given a case memory CM = (Af, R, A, £2, ?, a , pr00t) we define the function 
a: M  —» 2m
by a(v) = {p [ (v, p) e  A, and if (v, k), (n, p) s  A then v = k  or iz = p}
Given the MOP p  e  Af, we call members of a(p) the abstraction MOPs of p. The elements of a(p) 
are the minimal MOPs among all MOPs that are more abstract than p.
Definition 3.8: Given a case memory CM = (Af, /?, A, £2, ?, o , proof) we define the function 
a: Af -> 2W 
by p e  s(v) » v e  fl(p)
Given the MOP p  e  Af, wc call the members of s(p) the specialization MOPs of p.
If we view a  as a multi-valued function a: Af -»  Af where a(\i) is the set o f values a assigns to p, 
then s can be viewed as the (multi-valued) inverse o f a.
Definition 3.9: Given a case memory CM = (Af, R, A, £2, ?, o , pr0£>/), a slot is an element o f R x  M ’ 
= /? x (Af u  {£2,.?}).
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Given a slot A. = (p, |X), p is called the role of X, and p. is called the filler of X. If X e  a(v), then we
denote p. as v.p. The constraint on o  makes the notation v.p well-defined. If p  = ? then p is.called
a goal. Given v e M .w c  denote the set o f roles associated with v 
{p e  R 13 p  e  Af' so that (p, p) e  o(v)J
as v.R.
Definition 3.10: p  e  Af is a slotless MOP if o(p) = 0 .
Definition 3.11: A MOP p(- is an input case if 
a(p,-) contains at least one goal,
• a(p,) = 0 ,  and
• s(P;) = 0 .
All other MOPs arc called library cases.
For notational convenience, we partition Af into two disjoint sets Af,- and Ma. Mi is the set 
{p e  Af I .r(p) = 0}
of instance MOPs and Ma = M — M,- is the set of abstraction MOPs. Instance MOPs have no fur­
ther specialization MOPs. Abstraction MOPs are the abstractions of other MOPs.
We are now in a position to define the abstraction constraint on A (or, equivalently, on a). There 
are limitations concerning which MOPs may be members of the abstraction set o(p) of an abstrac­
tion MOP p. Abstraction constraints may be specified in various ways. A particularly simple one 
would be to require that every member of n(p) contain the same set p./? = {p e  R I (p,/) e a(p)] of 
slot roles as p, and that the fillers o f corresponding roles be identical. That would be a strict con-
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straint since it requires an exact match. We use a more relaxed abstraction constraint by requiring 
that the fillers of some members of o(p) be abstractions of the corresponding fillers in p.
We found that the abstraction constraint used in CBR system implementations reported by [Schank 
1982; Riesbeck & Schank 1989] works for our purposes.
Definition 3.12: The abstraction constraint specifies that a MOP p can be an abstraction of a MOP 
p ', i.e. (p', p) e  A, if and only if
1. p  is not an instance MOP, and
2. p  is not a slotless MOP, and
3. V p g  p.R, if p g  p t h e n  p'.p must satisfy p.p.
A f il le r / ' g  M '  is said to satisfy the conditions specified by another f i l le r /g  M ', when one or 
more of the following conditions is true;
• / i s  £1
• / i s  an abstraction o f / ' ,  that is, ( f ' , f )  e  A.
• / i s  an instance MOP and/ '  is £2
• / i s  not s lo tless,/' is not £2,f.R  £ / '. /? ,  and V p e  / .  R, an d /'.p  satisfies/.p.
We define the following operations on a CM:
Insertion of an instance MOP p,- g  Mi into a case memory is the process of determining the set 
fl(Pi). (IFor abstraction MOPs p  g  Ma, a(p) is already specified by the user and the abstraction 
constraint.) The set a(p,-) is determined in the following way:
a(P;) = { p  e Mfl | (p,-, p) g  A in accordance with the abstraction constraint and 
- i  3 p ' 3: p ' g  s(p) and p (- satisfies p ' }
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In other words the MOP p t- becomes a specialization of the most specialized MOPs in the CM 
whose abstraction constraint it satisfies.
Given the set a(p,) o f an input case p.,-, matching is a mapping jt: M  —»2M where the range of rc(p,) 
is a set S  is defined as follows:
5 = { p  e  M | p e  .^(p,*)), P * P ;}
S is called the set o f siblings of p,-, and consists of the MOPs having a parent in common with p,\
The input case is mapped into the member of S  that best matches the input case based on some 
metric. Recall that a metric is a distance measure A satisfying the following four properties:
A(a, p) 5: 0
• A(a, P) = A(P, a)
A(a, a) = 0
• A(a, p) + A(p, y) ^  A(a, y)
Finding a generally suitable definition o f A is one o f the major current research problems in CBR. 
The simplest measure o f dissimilarity between two cases is the number of slots for which they 
have different fillers. It is defined as follows:
P„
A(pr  P2) = £  5 (P j.p , p2.p)
P =  Pi
where ( pj, p* .... p„ } G Pi R and
8(p j.p , p 2.p ) =
if p r  p = p2.p  then 0 
otherwise 1
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3.4 Use of Models in Case Based Diagnosis
Diagnosis is the process of replacing the filler ? of unsolved slots by an appropriate member of M, 
in particular replacing the ? fillers o f the slots fault and causal explanation (abbreviated ce). This 
replacement is taking place during the adaptation phase. The filler of fault in some library case p.,
i.e. p.fault, is a MOP, whereas p.ce is a MOP designating a set of tuples X c ( £ x £ )  such that for 
every (elt e-j) e  X e\ causes e2 .
The utilization of models in case-based diagnosis takes place in the adaptation phase. It is done as 
follows:
Let be an input case
«(P») = M- 
d=  A (p ,,p )
■d £  0, is some threshold value
p.ce is the causal explanation of p
p,-.ce is the causal explanation of p,% Initially p;.ce = ?
Step 1:
p,-.ce := p.ce
p.faull„ i f r f> f t  
p..fault := d
1 p.fault i f d c f l
where p.faulta is non-detcrminislically chosen member of a(p. fault)
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Step 2:
Case 1: { p,- and p  have identical symptoms }
If, every (p, f,) e a  (p) where p e  f, the set of symptoms
pf.p = p.p
then; { i.e. adopt p.ce unchanged }
Case 2: { p; has symptoms that do not appear in p  }
If there is at least one (p, f;) e  c  (p,-) 
where p e  Y,
Pj.p 'normal’ 
and p.p = ‘normal’ 
then P/.ce := p.ce
Subcase 1:
if (e, p) e  Z, then pf.ce := u  p,-.ce (e, p)
Subcase 2:
if Cki. k2) e  F,
(k2, p) g <t>,
(kj, e) g  <I>,
and p/.e ^  ‘normal’
then p,-.ce := p,-.ce u  (e, p)
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Case 3: { has symptoms that do not appear in p (- }
If there is at least one (p, 1) e  a  (p.) 
where p g  Y, 
pj-.p = ‘normal’, 
p.p *  ‘normal’,
and (<t>, p) e  <I>, { <I> is the manifestation m odel) 
then,
Subcase 1:
if  (k; , k2) e  F„,
(k7,<t>)e<h, 
and (k2, p) e  O,
then for every (4», p) g  p,-.ce := p,-.ce - (<j>, p)
Subcase 2:
if (k/t k2) g  Fj,
( k l t  <|>) g  <h, 
and (k2, p) g
then p is rejected as the most similar case for p,-.
In practice we retrieve the next closest (in terms of A) case from the set S.
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Chapter 4
A Prototype
4.1 Introduction
The described research in this thesis integrates case-based and model-based reasoning techniques 
for dealing with physical system faults. In order to demonstrate the challenges and benefits of such 
work a prototypical system called Epaion has been designed and implemented in the aircraft 
domain.
Epaion contains a self-organizing memory structured as a frame-based abstraction hierarchy, as 
defined by [Schank 1982], for storing previously encountered problems. Currently each case has 
been represented in a memory organization packet (MOP) as implemented in [Riesbeck and 
Schank 1989].
Each case represents an actual aircraft accident report and consists of a set of features that identify 
the particular accident, a set o f observable symptoms, and a causal explanation that describes the 
relationship between various system states and observable features. The set o f identifying features 
includes information such as aircraft type, airline, flight number, date of the accident, etc. The set 
o f symptoms includes infonnation about abnormal observations from mechanical sensors such as 
the value o f the exhaust gas temperature, the value of engine pressure ratio, or from "human sen­
sors,” such as the sound of an explosion or the smell of smoke in the passenger cabin.
In contrast to other CBR rescarcli efforts, each case in our methodology consists not only o f a set 
o f previously observed symptoms, but also represents sequences of events over certain time inter­
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vals. The time intervals are of unknown and uneven length; it is their ordering that it is o f impor­
tance. Such temporal information is necessary when reasoning about operating physical systems, 
since the set of symptoms observed at a particular time may represent improvement or deteriora­
tion from a previous reading, or may reveal valuable fault propagation information. In a je t engine, 
for example, the fact that die fan rotational speed was observed to be abnormal prior to an abnor­
mal observation o f the compressor rotational speed is indicative that the faulty component is the 
fan and that the fault propagated to the compressor, rather than the reverse.
In addition, the system incorporates a model, called the world knowledge model, that represents 
the reasoner’s knowledge of causal relationships between states and observable symptoms, as well 
as deep domain knowledge such as functional connections among the components of the physical 
system about which the reasoncr must reason.
4.2 The domain
Epaion is being designed and implemented in the aircraft domain. Several aspects of the aircraft 
domain make automation of in-flight diagnosis challenging. In contrast with non-operative diag­
nosis (i.e., diagnosis of systems that can be shut down), symptoms in aircraft subsystems may 
change with time because of failure propagation. Information about the operational status of many 
aircraft components may be unavailable or incomplete due to limited instrumentation, and safety 
and comfort considerations place further constraints on in-flight testing.
Automation of in-flight fault diagnosis and prognosis can be used as an aid to the flight crew for 
early detection o f a problem or failure. This provides the crew with more time to respond more 
effectively and reduce potential damage due to the failure.
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The aircraft model used in this research is the same one used by [Abbott 1990] in her work on fault 
diagnosis. It is a simplified model of the propulsion system of a two-engine civil transport. This 
system consists of two turbofan engines and a fuel subsystem. A total of nine components are 
included. Four of them arc sensors.
A turbofan engine was chosen since it is commonly used on civil transport aircraft. [Abbott 1990] 
describes the function of the engine as follows: The air enters the fan, a low-pressure compressor. 
The fan compresses the air, which flows to the high-pressure compressor. There the air is com­
pressed further. It passes to the combustion section, which sprays fuel to mix with the highly com­
pressed air, and ignites tlicm. Ignition increases the velocity and temperature of the air, turning the 
turbines as the air flows to the exhaust section. The turbine section is divided into two stages. 
These two stages are connected to the fan and compressor with concentric shafts. The first turbine 
stage drives the compressor and the second stage drives the fan.
The engine has five sensors whose reading provide the following parameter values: N l, N2, Fuel 
flow (FF), exhaust gas temperature (EGT), and engine pressure ratio (EPR). The N l and N2 sen­
sors measure the rotational speeds o f the fan and high-pressure compressor, respectively. The fan 
and compressor generally rotate at different speeds because they are connected to different turbine 
stages. Fuel flow measures the rate at which the fuel is entering the engine. EGT is the exhaust gas 
temperature. EPR is a ratio of the air pressure at the engine inlet Figure 4.1 shows the schematic 
o f a turbo-fan je t engine.
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Figure 4.1: Schematic of a turbofan jet engine
4.3 Knowledge Sources
Epaion draws its power from several knowledge sources, including a library o f aircraft accident/ 
incidents; a functional dependency model with deep domain information about the functional 
dependencies between the components of the aircraft; and a model representing causal informa­
tion concerning transitions between various states of the aircraft.
4.3.1 Case Library
Epaion maintains a library of actual aircraft accident/incident scenarios called cases. Each case 
consists of a set of features that identify the particular scenario, a list o f the relevant context vari­
ables and their particular status, a set of observable symptoms, the fault, and a causal explanation 
that connects the observable symptoms to a justifying cause. The set of identifying features 
includes information such as aircraft type, airline, flight number, date o f the accident, and similar 
data. The list o f context variables includes information such as the phase of flight, the weather, etc. 
The set of symptoms includes information about abnormal observations from mechanical sensors
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such as the value of the exhaust gas temperature, the value of engine pressure ratio, or from 
“human sensors,” such as the sound of an explosion, or the smell of smoke in the passenger cabin. 
Cases containing all o f tills information are called library cases, whereas cases where the fault and 
the causal explanation arc not available are called input cases.
In contrast to most other CBR research efforts, each case in our methodology consists not only of 
a set o f previously observed symptoms, but also represents sequences o f events over certain time 
intervals. The time intervals may have unknown and unequal lengths; it is the event ordering that it 
is of importance. Such temporal information is necessary when reasoning about operating physical 
systems, since the set o f symptoms observed at a particular time may represent improvement or 
deterioration from a previous reading, or may reveal valuable fault propagation information. In a 
jet engine, for example, the fact that the fan rotational speed was observed to be abnormal prior to 
an abnormal observation of the compressor rotational speed is indicative that the faulty component 
is the fan and that the fault propagated to the compressor, rather than the reverse.
The following is an example of an actual case:
Identification Features:
Id: NTSB-AAR-76-19 
Date: November 12,1975 
Airline: Overseas National Airways 
Flight: Flight 32 
Aircraft: DC-10-30
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Context Variables
Phase of Flight: Take off
4 3  Knowledge Sources
Symptoms
Fuel Flow: Initially normal, then fluctuating, then low 
N l: Started fluctuating, then became high, then low 
N2: Initially normal, then fluctuating, then low 
EGT: Initially normal, then became high 
EPR: Initially normal, then became high, then low
Fault
Bird ingestion
Causal Explanation
Bird ingestion caused fan blade damage,
which in return caused fan rotor imbalance,
which in return caused abnormal rotational speed of the fan.
Also the fan rotor imbalance caused abnormal rotational speed of the compressor.
The abnormal rotational speed of the compressor caused abnormal fuel flow, 
it also cause abnormal exhaust gas temperature.
The abnormal fuel flow caused abnormal exhaust pressure ratio.
4.3.2 Causality Model
Epaion’s causality model contains information such as ‘’fan-bladc separation causes the rotational 
speed o f the fan to fluctuate” and ‘’the rotational speed of the fan causes the engine pressure ratio
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to fluctuate.” Along with the causal information between two states, e.g. ‘’inefficient air flow” and 
‘ 'slowing down o f the engine” , the model maintains a frequency count of the number of times that 
the system witnessed that inefficient air flow caused the engine to slow down.
Our research alleviates the knowledge acquisition problem to which current model-based systems 
are subject by letting each case of the CBR reasoning mechanism contribute its causal explana­
tion, gained from adapting previous incidents, to the formation and maintenance of the causality 
model. This model can therefore be considered as a general depository of knowledge accumulated 
through time. In return the model aids the matching and adaptation processes of the CBR reason­
ing mechanism and enables Epaion to make prognoses that are beyond the knowledge of each 
individual library case.
4.3.3 Functional Dependency Model
The functional dependency submodel is a digraph model of an aircraft system, with nodes repre­
senting primitive components, and arrows connecting (linking) nodes representing functional 
dependencies. Component B is said to be functionally dependent on component A if the proper 
functioning of B depends on the proper functioning of A. For example, the control surfaces of an 
aircraft are functionally dependent on the hydraulic system, since they will cease operating if the 
latter fails. The functional dependency submodel contains two kind o f arrows, representing imme­
diate and non-immediate links between components. Two components Cj and C2  are connected 
via an immediate link (I-link) when abnormal function of C | at time t( results in abnormal func­
tion of C2  at time t2  and tj= I2 . If t2  ^  tj then Cj is connected to C2  via an non-immediate link (N- 
link). For example, the engine driven pump (EDP) bypass valve is connected via an N-link to the 
EDP filter, but the EDP filter is connected to EDP bypass valve via an I-link.
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In order to efficiently represent the Functional and Physical Dependency Models a modeling tool 
named L1MAP was developed. This tool is oriented toward efficient information representation/ 
manipulation over fixed finite domains, and quantification over paths and predicates. The initial 
motivation for the creation of such a system was the fact that the need for such operations arose 
frequently in the domain of diagnosis/prognosis generation problem domain. Since then it has 
become apparent that the facilities provided are applicable to problems both within and outside of 
AI. The motivation about LIMAP, its implementation, and its capabilities are presented in appen­
dix A.
Using LIMAP the functional dependencies are represented in a symbolic matrix. Figure 4.2 shows 
the functional dependency graph for the engine depicted in figure 4.1. Figure 4.3 depicts the adja-
EPR
EGT
N l
N2
Fan
Combustor
Compressor
Aft-Turbine
Figure 4.2: Functional dependency graph of an engine
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cency matrix representing the je t engine functional dependency predicate Engine(x,y) o f Figure 
4.2 over the domain Comps=(fan, compressor, combustor, fwd-turbine, aft-turbine, Nl-sensor, 
N2-sensor, EGT-sensor, EPR-sensor). A value of 1 in location i j  represents the fact that compo­
nent i is connected to component j.
COMPONENT (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fan (0) 1 1 1 . . .
Compressor (1) 1 1 1
Combustor (2) . 1 ........................................................................................
Fwd-turbine (3) 1 1
Aft-turbine (4) 1 1 1
Nl Sensor (5) . •
N2 Sensor (6) . .
EGT Sensor (7) . 4
EPR Sensor (8) 4 * * • • 4 » »
Figure 4.3: Adjacency matrix for je t engine depicted in figure 4.1
4.3.4 Physical Dependency Model
The physical dependency model is a digraph of an aircraft system, similar to the functional depen­
dencies digraph, in which the links in the graph represent potential paths o f fault propagation due 
to physical proximity. This sort o f propagation occurs when uncontrolled dischaiges of energy 
attendant on component malfunctions propagate to neighboring systems. The severing o f nearby 
hydraulic lines by blade fragments from a disintegrating turbine provides a typical example. As 
with the Functional Dependency Model, this model is also implemented using LIMAP.
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4,3.5 The Abstraction Hierarchy
4 3  Knowledge Sources
The case-based reasoning component of Epaion consists o f a self-organizing memory structured 
as a frame-based abstraction hierarchy, as defined by [Schank 1982]. This memory forms an upper 
bounded semi-lattice that contains domain specific information at dilferent levels o f abstraction. 
The information contained in the lattice includes:
a. The names of all the components in an aircraft engine.
b. The components that are sensors. The exhaust gas temperature, the rotational speed of the 
fan, and the fuel How indicator are some of the mechanical sensors in an aircraft’s engine. 
Vision, sight, and smell are the "human sensors" used in the diagnostic process.
c. The possible values for each sensor. For a mechanical sensor the allowable values are: 
lower than expected; normal; higher than expected. If a sensor initially indicates values 
that are normal, then at the following time interval indicates values that are lower than 
expected, and at the third time interval still indicates values which are lower than 
expected, then the status of the sensor during these three time intervals is normal, lower, 
lower which is a kind of (i.e., a subcategoiy of) overall lower than expected status which 
in turn is a kind of abnormal status.
d. The various faults that may be observed in an engine subsystem. For example it is repre­
sented that seagull ingestion is a kind of bird ingestion fault which is a kind of foreign 
object ingestion fault and so on.
e. Information on how faults manifest themselves. For example, the fan vibration and abnor-
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mality in the rotational speed of the fan are manifestations o f a problem in the fan.
f. The accident/incidents that the system already knows. For example the system knows that 
the incident of a China Airlines Boeing 747 that suffered a mishap over the Pacific Ocean 
on February 19,1985 [NTSB-AAR-86-03] is an instance o f an accident/incident since it is 
a kind of rotor related scenario which is a kind of engine related scenario which is a kind 
of accidcnt/incidcnt scenario.
4.4 Reasoning Cycle
Epaion's reasoning cycle consists of the following three phases: input a new problem; retrieve the 
most similar case; adapt the retrieved case to fit the current scenario.
4.4.6 Case Matching and Retrieval Process
When the system experiences a new set o f symptoms, i.e., when faced with an input (new) case, it 
searches its case library for the most similar case. This is done by placing the input case in self­
organizing MOP memory under the most appropriate parents, determined as described in Chapter
2. The siblings may therefore be assumed to be closely related. The nearest sibling is retrieved as 
the case that is most on-point with respect to the input case.
A weighted count of corresponding symptoms between the input case and its siblings in the case 
library is used as a metric of similarity between the input case and each sibling. Based on the 
observation that in most cases similar faults manifest themselves in similar ways only during the
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first moments o f the fault occurrence [1], the system takes advantage of the available temporal 
information in each case, and gives higher degree of similarity to symptoms that manifest itself in 
similar ways during the first moments of the fault occurrence. For example, if in the input case the 
rotational speed o f the fan was initially abnormally high, then normal, and at the end was abnor­
mally low, then a library case where the rotational speed of the fan was initially abnormally high 
and continued to be high through out the entire scenario will get a higher degree o f similarity com­
paring to another library case where rotational speed of the fan was initially abnormally low and 
continued to be low through out the entire scenario.
In addition to the set of symptoms, Epaion takes into consideration the context variables of each 
case. For example, if the input case represents a scenario where an aircraft was flying at a high alti­
tude then this is taken into consideration to give smaller degrees of similarity to library cases 
where the cause of the fault was bird ingestion. This is in accordance with the fact that birds do not 
fly at high altitude.
4.4.7 The Case Adaptation Process
When the system finds and retrieves a similar case, Epaion assumes that the current fault is the 
same as the fault in the retrieved case and adapts the causal explanation of the retrieved case to fit 
the current case. Then both the fault and the causal explanation are stored in the case library for 
future usage. The system is provided with a set of adaptation rules which, in addition to adapting 
the retrieved causal explanation to fit the current case, find possible gaps in the causal explanation 
and fill in the missing causalities by using the model. This causal explanation connects the symp­
toms to a justifying cause, and thus the system’s causal reasoning ability produces a causal analy­
sis o f the new case, rather than simply a reference to a previous solution. The new causal analysis 
is not only stored in the case library as part of the input case, but is used to augment and modify
- 6 4 -
4  A Prototype 4.4 Reasoning Cycle
the causality knowledge of the world model. The causal analysis consists of a sequence of pairs of 
the type "event A causes event B '\  "event B causes event C” and so on. Each of these pairs is 
stored in the database of the causal submodel. In the case that the model already knows about the 
causal relation between two events from a previously encountered case, the system updates the 
frequency count between the two events. The world model is therefore created based on the previ­
ous behavior of the physical system, and is constantly updated based on the current behavior, 
either by augmenting its previous causal knowledge or "becoming more sure” about causal rela­
tions.
Epaion’s adaptation algorithm is summarized in the following two steps:
The first step involves the transfer of the fault from the library case in the input case and consists 
o f two possibilities.
Case 1: If the match between the input case and the library case exceeds a threshold value then the 
fault is transferred intact, thus if in the library case the fault was a malfunctioning fuel controller 
then it is assumed to be the same in the input case.
Case 2: If the match is below the threshold value then an abstraction of the library case fault is 
transferred to the input case. For example, if in the library case the fault was bird ingestion, then it 
is assumed that in the input case the fault is foreign object ingestion.
The second step involves the adaptation of the causal explanation of the library case so it can 
explain every, or as many as possible, of the symptoms of the input scenario by connecting them to 
a justifying cause. This consists of the following possibilities:
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Case 1: If the library case and the input case have identical symptoms then the causal explanation 
of the library case is transferred intact to the input case.
Case 2: If the input case contains symptoms that do not appear in the library case then the causal 
explanation of the library case is transferred in the input case and the following additional process­
ing takes place. Let <J>2 be an unexplained input case symptom.
Subcase 1: If the causal submodel contains the relation <J>j causes $2 . and <J>j is a symptom or 
manifestation in the input case, then the link <)>] causes $ 2  is added in the causal explanation of 
the input case.
Subcase 2: The causal portion of the model does not contain the relation causes <J)2i but the 
functional dependency submodel knows that component C2 is functionally dependent on com­
ponent C l, and 4>i is a manifestation of abnormal behavior of component C l, and similarly 
is a manifestation of C2. This knowledge is depicted by the graph
to *2
i i  j i
D
 ►
Ci C2
Figure 4.4: A causal scenario
where <j) denotes a phenomenon that is a symptom or manifestation (p) o f abnormal behavior of a 
component. Additionally, if 4>i is a symptom in the input case and time((j>i) < time((t>2), i.e., Symp­
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tom fj appeared before 4*2 then the link <j>i causes <J>2 is added in the causal explanation of the input 
case.
Case 3: If the library case has symptoms that do not appear in the input case then the causal expla­
nation of the library case is transferred in the input case and the following additional processing 
takes place. Let (J>2 be sucli a symptom in the library case. Then the causal explanation of the 
library case will contain the relation <J>i causes 4>2 -
Figure 4.5: Relation <j)j causes <|>2
Subcase 1: Suppose that this configuration occurs in the functional portion of the model.
4>1
Figure 4.6: A causal scenario
Then this library case is rejected as explanation of the input case since if  C l were in fact abnormal 
in the input case, then the immediate link between C l and C2 indicates that this malfunction must
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propagate immediately to C2, and therefore a manifestation of C2’s abnormality would be present. 
But the input case shows no such manifestation, so C l is normal.
Subcase 2: Suppose that this configuration occurs in the functional portion of the model.
* 1  * 2
a  A
D
 ►
ci C2
Figure 4.7: A causal scenario
where 4>2's the unmatched library case symptom and D is a non immediate link between compo­
nent C l and C2. Then the library symptom $ 2  is ignored, since it is possible that <t>2 will occur later 
in the library case. Therefore every relation of the form X causes is discarded from the trans­
ferred causal explanation.
At this point Epaion has used knowledge of how faults manifest themselves, knowledge of causal 
links between fault manifestations, and knowledge about links between components to explain as 
many of the symptoms that are present in the input case. Any additional symptoms will remain 
unexplained.
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Chapter 5
Evaluation
5.1 Introduction
The diagnostic methodology presented in this thesis was evaluated by means of an analytical anal­
ysis of the methodology and by an empirical analysis of the prototype developed to support the 
merit of the methodology. In the analytical evaluation we describe the characteristics from which 
the methodology draws its power, and discuss the consequences of incompleteness or elimination 
of the four knowledge sources that are involved in this methodology. The empirical analysis eval­
uates the prototype that was build in order to support the merit of the methodology. This evalua­
tion was done by running Epaion on actual accident cases and comparing the results with the 
conclusions of the official investigations on these accidents.
Before the evaluations we present two examples in order to demonstrate how Epaion works. The 
first example involves two realistic scenarios. EPAION was given the symptoms observed on Jan­
uary 8,1989 by the flight crew of British Midland Airways and retrieved as the most on-point case 
scenario the Overseas National Airways flight 32 crash that occurred on November 12, 1975. For 
the second example Epaion was given a complex hypothetical scenario. This example demon­
strates Epaion using all o f its knowledge sources, the library case, the functional dependency sub­
model, the causality submodel, and its abstraction hierarchy in order to connect all o f the observed 
symptoms in the hypothetical scenario to a justifying cause.
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5.2 Examples
The ideas presented in this thesis are demonstrated by the following examples.
5.2.1 First Scenario
EPAION is given the symptoms observed on January 8,1989 by the flight crew o f British Midland 
Airways. The senario is summaried as follows:
The plane, a Boeing 737-400, was climbing out east of East Midlands Airport and the crew 
operated at a high workload. On this flight, the crew experienced severe vibration and smoke 
in the cockpit. The vibration monitor on the left engine .was at the high value, while the rota­
tional speed of the fan (N l) was fluctuating. Subsequently, the exhaust gas temperature 
(EGT), N l, and rotational speed of the compressor (N2) reached high levels. The fuel flow 
was low. The vibration continued to be severe and the fuel flow low, but N l and N2 dimin­
ished to low levels.
Epaion's first task is to use the features of the current situation for finding the most similar sce­
nario from its case library. In this example the retrieved scenario is the Overseas National Airways 
flight 32 crash that occurred on November 12,1975. The scenario is summarized as follows:
The plane, a DC-10-30, was taking off from John F. Kennedy International Airport, in New 
York. The crew observed that the rotational speed of the fan (N l) was fluctuating, along with 
the rotational speed of the compressor (N2) and exhaust pressure ratio (EPR). Later on Nl and 
N2 were increasing to high while the exhaust gas temperature (EGT) and the EPR were
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increasing to high also. The Fuel-Flow began fluctuating. Finally N l, N2, and Fuel-Flow 
started decreasing and reached low levels. The EGT continued to increase.
The Overseas National Airways crash was retrieved as the most-on-point case for the British Mid­
land Airways scenario because of high degree of similarity in the behavior of the fuel flow, the 
rotational speed of the fan, the rotational speed of compressor and the exhaust gas temperature. 
The behavior of the exhaust pressure ratio (EPR) was not taken into consideration since the 
engines on the Midland aircraft were General Electric CFM56s, which have no EPR sensor. Other 
cases in the library that demonstrated similarities in features such as the type of the airplane, the 
type o f the engines, the airline, the phase of the flight, the altitude, etc., were not retrieved since 
similarity in these features is considered less significant.
Following the retrieval, EPAION assumes that the cause o f the symptoms in the current situation 
is the same as the one in the retrieved case. In the Overseas National crash the cause was fan blade 
damage and the system tries to explain as many as possible o f the Midland symptoms based on 
that cause. This is done by adapting the causal explanation of the Overseas National case to fit the 
current situation.
In the Overseas National case a large number of sea gulls were ingested into the engine causing 
the engine to disintegrate. The disintegration resulted in abnormalities in the rotational speed of 
the fan (N l) and the rotational speed of the compressor (N2). Abnormality in N2 caused the abnor­
mal behavior of fuel flow and the high levels of EGT. In turn the fuel flow abnormality caused die 
EPR abnormality. This chain of events explains the behavior of N l, N2, EGT and fuel flow in the 
Midland scenario but does not explain the fan vibration experienced by the Midland flight crew.
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In order to explain the fan vibration EPAION utilizes its models. The causal model informs the 
system that based on previous cases the system has learned that the leading (most often observed) 
cause of fan vibration is fan blade damage. Based on that knowledge the system explains Mid­
lands fan vibration as a result of the fan blade damage. Since all of the Midland symptoms have 
been explained, EPAION creates the causal explanation for Midland by connecting each symptom 
to its cause. This causal explanation is associated with the Midland accident scenario and is stored 
in the case library.
5.2.2 Second Scenario
We assume that EPAION is given the following data:
The plane is climbing out, with the crew operating at moderate workload. The engine com­
manded status is at climb power. The weather is icing. The crew observes a small thrust short­
fall and vibration in the compressor and fan rotors. The compressor rotor speed (N2) shows a 
5% shortfall. The exhaust gas temperature (EGT) and fuel flow are slightly lower than 
expected.
Oi Epaion’s first task is to use the features of the current situation for finding the most similar sce­
nario from its case library. In this example, the selection process results in retrieval of the follow­
ing case:
The plane was climbing out, with the crew operating at a moderate workload. The engine 
commanded status was at climb power. The meteorological conditions were icing. Fan blade 
damage, caused by ice ingestion, produced an abrupt change of vibration in the fan rotor and 
abnormality in the rotational speed of the fan (Nl).
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Following the retrieval, EPAION assumes that the cause of the symptoms in the current situation 
is the same as the one in the retrieved case. In this example the cause is ice ingestion and the sys­
tem tries to explain all or most of the current symptoms based on that cause. This is done by adapt­
ing the causal explanation of the retrieved case to fit the current situation.
In the retrieved case ice ingestion caused imbalance o f the fan rotor, which in turn caused the fan 
to vibrate and rotate at abnormal speed. This chain of events explains the fan vibration in the cur­
rent situation, but docs not explain the abnormalities in the speed o f the compressor rotor, the 
EGT, the fuel flow and the compressor vibration.
In order to give explanations for these symptoms EPAION utilizes its models. The causal model 
informs the system that based on previous cases the system has learned that the leading cause of 
abnormal speed o f the compressor rotor is abnormal vibration of the fan and the leading cause for 
abnormal EGT and fuel (low is abnormality in the speed of the compressor rotor. In addition, the 
causal submodel informs the system that the leading cause of abnormal thrust output is vibration 
of the compressor. Based on that knowledge the system explains the current abnormality in the 
compressor rotor speed as a result of the abnormal fan vibration and the low levels of EGT and 
fuel flow as a result of the compressor rotor speed shortfall. The thrust shortfall is explained as a 
product o f the compressor vibration.
At this point all of the current symptoms are explained except for the compressor vibration. The 
system from its knowledge contained in the abstraction hierarchy knows that vibration of the com­
pressor is a manifestation of abnormal behavior of the engine’s compressor. The functional model 
knows that the compressor is functionally dependent on the fan and therefore tries to find if any of
i
the manifestations of abnormal fan operation are being experienced by the crew. Fan vibration is 
one of the current symptoms and is a manifestation o f abnormal fan operation, therefore the sys­
tem explains the compressor vibration as a product o f the fan vibration. The set of symptoms of
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the retrieved scenario contains an abnormality in the rotational speed of the fan. This is not experi­
enced during the current situation, therefore no further explanations are needed.
As soon as all symptoms are explained, EPAION creates the causal explanation of the current case 
by connecting each symptom to its cause. This causal explanation is associated with the current 
situation, and is also stored in the case library for future reference. Figure 1 displays the chain of 
causal events in tire retrieved and die current case.
CURRENT SITUATION RETRIEVED CASE
FOREIGN OB JECT INGESTION ICE INGESTION
FAN ROTOR IMBALANCE FAN ROTOR IMBALANCE
Abnormal 
Fuel Flow Fan Blade Damage Fan Blade Damage
Fan Vibration Abnormal
N lFan Vibration
Abnormal
EGT
Compressor Vibration
Abnormal Thrust
^  Links due to the transfer from the retrieved case
I,,,,. Links due to the causal model
Links due to the dependency models
Figure 5.1: Causal explanations of retrieved and current case
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5.3 Analytical Evaluation of the Methodology
The analytical analysis of the diagnostic methodology presented in this thesis involves a descrip­
tion of the characteristics from which the methodology draws its power, and a discussion of the 
consequences of incompleteness or elimination of the necessary knowledge that this methodology 
requires. This analysis is domain independent and applies to any rcasoner that will attempt to rea­
son about physical systems within the framework of the diagnostic methodology presented in this 
thesis.
Epaion’s diagnostic methodology draws its power from the following four knowledge sources: the 
library case, the functional dependency submodel, the causality submodel, and the abstraction 
hierarchy. In tills section we describe the important characteristics o f each knowledge source, 
together with the consequences of not possessing these characteristics.
5.3.1 The Case Libraiy
The methodology presented in this thesis requires that the reasoner maintain a library of previ­
ously solved problems. Each problem is a description of a physical system malfunction and the 
manifestation of the malfunction. For example, Epaion’s case library consists of actual aircraft 
accident/incident scenarios. Information provided in the individual accident/incident reports from 
the National Transportation Board (NTSB), the British Air Accidents Investigation Branch 
(AAIB), and data collected from test accidents staged at Boeing Inc. [Shontz et. at. 1992] was used 
to derive the appropriate information constituting each case.
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Case Description
Each malfunction is described as a set features. Each feature has an associated set o f possible val­
ues. The features are clustered into the following five categories: Identification Features, Context 
Variables, Symptoms, Fault, Causal Explanation. The choice of the features is done by taking in to 
consideration:
a. If a particular feature is unique in the sense that the value of that feature identifies one and 
only one case, then this feature should be included as an identification feature.
b. If a particular feature does not have a unique value but the value of the feature may help 
the human operators of the physical system to be reminded o f an actual case that they hap­
pen to have directly or indirectly witnessed, then this feature may be included as an identi­
fication feature. For example, Epaion includes as identification features the features 
airline and date. These features do not have unique values for each case but collectively 
may remind pilots about a particular accident or incident.
c. If the physical system includes a mechanical sensor that monitors the behavior of a partic­
ular component, then each case must include a feature that describes the behavior of the 
sensor.
d. If there are is an event that may be witnessed by the human operators o f the physical sys­
tem, then each case must include a feature that describes the presence or absence of this 
event.
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Whenever one of the above conditions holds, the corresponding feature must be be included in a 
particular case. Exceptions are the fault and causal explanation features that every case must 
include. Each case must include a feature that reveals the fault in the particular case. In addition a 
feature should be included that describes the chain of events that connects each observable symp­
tom to a justifying cause. When the fault and causal explanation features are missing the reason- 
er’s task is to find a value for those two features.
5.3.2 The Functional Dependencies Submodel
The functional dependencies submodel possesses two kinds of constituents: components, and 
interconnections between components.
Interconnections
Functional dependency links represent all the potential paths of normal interaction between com­
ponents in the physical system. When a fault occurs, the effect o f the fault is expected to propagate 
along one of the paths in the functional dependencies model. Whether or not a normal interaction 
occurs along a particular path may depend on specific parameters that are unavailable in the 
model. By representing all potential of normal interaction we can represent even those fault cases 
where the interaction is not anticipated under the current scenario but happens unexpectally 
[Abbott 1990].
Definition and Choice o f Components
A component is a physical part or set of parts o f the particular physical system that the reasoner is 
called to reason about. A component may consist o f other components which in turn may have
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subcomponents, etc. A physical system may have a varying number of components, depending on 
the level of detail at which we view the system. Choosing the appropriate level of detail means 
choosing which components we need to include in the model of the physical system so we can 
have appropriate diagnoses of abnormal behavior. The choice of components is done by taking in 
to consideration [Abbott 90]:
a. Whether a particular component must be identified as faulty when it breaks. If it is impor­
tant to identify when a component fails, say because the manifestation of the failure may 
be apparent to the operators of the physical system, then this component should be 
included in the model.
b. Whether a component can be disambiguated with the available sensors.
c. Whether a particular component is needed in the propagation path to determine the propa­
gation of abnormal behavior. If a particular component is a branching point in the propa­
gation path that enables identification o f the propagation to other components then it must 
be included in the model.
If none of the above factors holds, then a component either should not be included in the func­
tional dependencies submodel, or aggregating it to the next higher level o f detail should be consid­
ered. For example, in Epaion's functional dependencies submodel individual fan blades are not 
included in the model of an aircraft’s engine because it makes no difference if blade 8 or blade 9 
fails. An additional reason the submodel does not include fan blades is that there is no sensor 
information to identify individual fan blades. On the other had, by aggregating the fan blades to 
the next higher level of detail the engine’s fan is included in the submodel.
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When a component fails, the reasoning system will be aware of the manifestation of this failure. If 
one of the above factors holds but the component is not modeled in the functional dependencies 
submodel then the reasoning system will not have the ability to link this manifestation to a justify­
ing cause since it will have no knowledge of functional dependency between the component that is 
not modeled and other components in the submodel.
5.3.3 The Physical Dependencies Submodel
Similarly to the functional dependencies submodel, the physical dependencies submodel possesses 
two characteristics: components, and the interconnections between components.
Interconnections
Physical dependency links represent potential paths of fault propagation that are due to physical 
proximity. This knowledge is contained in a graph representation similar to the representation of 
functional dependencies. The edges of the graph represent the physical proximity links and the 
nodes represent components.
Definition and Choice of Components
Components in this submodel are defined as in the functional dependency submodel and the crite­
ria for choosing which components we need to include in the physical submodel are the same with 
the criteria presented above.
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5.3.4 The Causal Dependencies Submodel
The characteristics of the causal dependencies submodel are: the events, and the relationship 
between the events.
Causal Relationship
A link between two events e t and e2, indicates that one did cause the other (say ej caused e2). The 
causality relationship between ej and e2 implies a temporal constituent: If ej occurred at time tt 
and e2  at time t2 then tt < t2.
Definition and Choice of Events
An event is a qualitative state transition to an abnormal state in the behavior of a physical system. 
Events may be witnessed cither by observing the behavior o f mechanical sensors or by stimulating 
"human sensors" such as sight, smell, and hearing. The choice of the events is done by taking in to 
consideration:
a. If the physical system has a mechanical sensor that monitors the function of a component 
or a process, then an event signaling the abnormal behavior of the function or the process 
must be included in lire set of events.
b. If there is occurrence that may be witnessed by the human operators of the physical sys­
tem, then an event signaling the occurrence must be included in the set of events. Such 
occurrences include the smell of smoke, visibility o f fire, hearing an explosion, etc.
- 8 1 -
5 Evaluation 5.3 Analytical Evaluation o f the Methodology
If one of the above factors holds but an event is not included in the list of events, then the reasoner 
loses its power of justifying the observable symptoms in a new situation precisely and in detail. 
Additionally, when the new situation is stored in the case library it becomes a "weak” most-on- 
point case for a potentially similar future input case.
5.3.5 The Abstraction Hierarchy
The information contained in the abstraction hierarchy must include:
a. The names of all the components in the physical system
b. The components dial are sensors.
c. The possible values for each sensor.
d. The types o f faults that may effect the physical system.
e. Information on how faults manifest.
f. The cases that the reasoner experienced.
All this information should be represented at different levels of abstraction. The levels of abstrac­
tion chosen must be dctennined by examining the domain itself, and what information the human 
operators o f the physical system might use to make decisions.
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The choice o f components and sensors is made based on the criteria followed for the choice of 
components in the dependency models. Experimental observation has proved that the most effec­
tive allowable values for each sensor are qualitative descriptions of the sensor readings. The range 
o f these values is the following enumerated set: normal, lower than expected, higher than 
expected, fluctuating. The types of faults that may effect the physical system along with informa­
tion on how faults manifest is domain dependent and may be elicited from domain experts.
An incomplete abstraction hierarchy may affect the reasoner’s capability to explain the presence 
o f the symptoms experienced in the current situation. The empirical evaluation of Epaion, as it is 
presented in the following section, serves as an example of the effects of incomplete knowledge in 
the reasoner’s abstraction hierarchy.
5.4 Empirical Evaluation of the Prototype
This section describes an empirical evaluation o f the diagnostic concepts implemented in Epaion. 
The evaluation uses actual aircraft accidents and incident cases, which were simulated to assess 
the effectiveness Epaion in diagnosing failures.
5.4.1 Approach
Epaion was developed using a software engineering strategy known as incremental code revision 
o r rapid prototyping. Rapid prototyping requires the incremental development of tire software 
design to be guided by preliminary evaluations o f the software. Our evaluation approach consisted
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of comparing Epaion’s output to the "correct answer” in order to determine how well the program 
has performed.
Information provided in the individual accident/incident reports from the National TYansportation 
Board (NTSB), the British Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB), and data collected from 
test accidents staged at Boeing Inc. [Shontz et. al. 1992] was used to derive the appropriate infor­
mation constituting each case, a process called accident reconstruction. We reconstructed a total of 
eighteen cases, of which twelve were used as library cases, and six as input cases.
Accident reconstruction is not a straightforward process and has its limitations. In the reconstruc­
tion process the symptoms from all accidents had to be identified from the sources that described 
the accidents. Unfortunately numerical sensor data from the engine parameters was not available, 
so the symptoms were used as reported in [Shontz et. al„ 1992], or derived based on the descrip­
tions in the NTSB or AAIB analysis of each accident. NTSB and AAIB reports did not always 
explicitly describe the symptoms in each case; even in those cases where symptoms were men­
tioned explicitly they were usually only those described by the flight crew. The sequence of symp­
toms could therefore not always be determined completely.
In addition a chain o f causalities had to be constructed for each of the accidents used as library 
cases. This chain explains each observed symptom by connecting the symptom to a justifying 
cause. Determining the causal explanation of the symptoms for each case was a difficult task 
because o f a paucity of definitive experts who could provide this information. While pilots, main­
tenance personnel, and aircraft system designers are all knowledgeable about some aspects of air­
craft diagnosis, each has deficiencies in one area or another. The causal explanations used in each 
library case were constructed after interviewing personnel with expertise in the above fields, and 
consulting NTSB and AAIB reports.
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The evaluation process required that each input case be presented to Epaion separately, and that 
the system produce a diagnosis along with a causal explanation. The diagnosis produced by 
Epaion was then compared with the correct diagnosis for the particular scenario. In addition, the 
reasoner was evaluated based on the number o f symptoms for which the reasoner was able to find 
a justification. A "correct diagnosis” is the diagnosis determined by NTSB, AAIB, or by [Shontz 
et. al. 1992]. Epaion is said to have produced a complete explanation if the system was able to 
explain each observed symptom by connecting the symptom to a justifying cause.
5.4.2 Results
In this section the resulting diagnosis for each input case is presented and discussed.
Case 1:
We presented to Epaion the incident of a British Midland Boeing 737-400 (G-OBMG) that took 
place on June 11, 1989 [AAIB-AAR-4/90]. In this incident the aircraft was climbing when the 
crew reported an onset of "thumping” and severe vibration. Reference to engine instruments 
revealed high indicated vibration with low and fluctuating rotational speed of the fan on the N2 
engine. The crew also reported that there was considerable smoke in the aft cabin, and that flames 
and sparks had been seen to come from the right engine. The aircraft landed without further inci­
dent, Examination of the engine after landing showed that the fan had been massively damaged.
Epaion correctly classified the incident as a case involving a rotor damage. Epaion already had in 
its library two other scenarios in this catcgoiy: an incident involving a Dan Air Boeing 737-400 
that took place on June 9,1989 [AAIB-AAR-4/90], and the accident of a British Midland Boeing 
737-400 that took place on January 8,1989 [AAIB-AAR-4/90]. Both library cases achieved a high
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degree of similarity with the current scenario, but the latter case achieved the highest degree of 
similarity, and therefore was retrieved as the most-on-point case for G-OBMG. The fault o f the 
retrieved case was assumed to be the fault in the current case, thus Epaion correctly diagnosed that 
the problem in the current scenario was fan blade damage. The causal explanation of the retrieved 
case was transferred to the current case, and since in both cases the fault manifested itself in a very 
similar way (similar symptoms though time), the transferred causal explanation was able to suc­
cessfully explain every symptom experienced in the G-OBMG.
Case 2:
Epaion was presented with the incident of an American Airlines Boeing 727 (Flight 566) that 
experienced a engine failure in its number one engine just after rotation on take-off from Greater 
Cincinnati Airport, Cincinnati, Ohio [NTSB-78-F-A067]. The captain performed emergency shut­
down procedures on the engine and returned to the airport. The NTSB determined that the engine 
failure was caused by several turbine blade separations.
Epaion correctly classified the incident as a scenario involving a rotor failure. Among four other 
cases under this category it retrieved as the most on-point case the above-mentioned incident of 
June 9, 1989, involving a Dan Air Boeing 747-400. The fault o f the retrieved case was assumed to 
be the fault in the current case, thus Epaion incorrectly diagnosed that the problem with the current 
scenario was fan blade damage instead of turbine blade damage. The transfer o f the causal links 
from the retrieved causal explanation was sufficient to explain all the symptoms in the American 
Airlines case except the abnormal exhaust pressure ratio. After consulting the causal model the 
system produced explanations for all the symptoms.
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Case 3:
The incident o f a China Airlines Boeing 747 (Flight 006) that suffered a mishap over the Pacific 
Ocean on February 19,1985 [NTSB-AAR-86-03] was presented to Epaion. The aircraft was cruis­
ing on autopilot when the crew misdiagnosed a flame-out in the number one engine. In reality 
another engine had a bad fuel controller and suffered a condition known as bleed-air hogging. The 
bad fuel controller caused a flame-out and due to a series of misdiagnoses and inappropriate cor­
rective actions by the crew the aircraft was put into a vertical dive. Finally the captain regained 
control of the aircraft and made a safe landing in San Francisco.
Epaion correctly classified the incident as a scenario involving a fuel subsystem failure. The 
library contained two other scenarios in this category. A Boeing test case involving a bad fuel 
metering unit was retrieved as the most on- point case. Because the degree of similarity between 
the China Airlines scenario and the retrieved case was not very high, Epaion correctly assumed 
that the current fault was an abstraction of the fault in the retrieved case, and determined that the 
fault was in the fuel subsystem. The transfer o f the causal links from the retrieved causal explana­
tion was sufficient to explain all the symptoms in the current scenario except the abnormal behav­
ior o f the Exhaust Pressure Ratio (EPR). By consulting its world model Epaion found that the 
abnormal EPR was due to the abnormality in the fuel flow, thus successfully explaining every 
observed symptom.
Case 4;
In June 1982 the Galunggung Volcano on the island of Java erupted. A Boeing 747 encountered 
the volcanic debris and experienced flame-outs on three engines while the aircraft was at 33,000
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feet. One engine was successfully restarted and an uneventful two-engine landing was accom­
plished [Lloyd 1990],
By relying on observations from “human sensors”, when Epaion was presented with this scenario 
it successfully classified Hie incident as a volcanic ingestion scenario. The systems case library 
contained two scenarios under this category. An incident of volcanic ingestion experienced by a 
Boeing 747-400 near Anchorage, Alaska on December 14,1989 [Lloyd 1990] was retrieved as the 
most on-point case. In both the input and the retrieved case the set of symptoms over time was 
almost identical, and therefore Epaion correctly determined the fault and produced a causal expla­
nation that covered all of the symptoms experienced in the Galunggung incident.
Case 5:
The accident of a Southern Airways DC-9 (Flight 242) that crashed in New Hope, Geoigia on 
April 4, 1977 [NTSB-AAR-78-3] was presented to Epaion. The aircraft had flown through heavy 
thunderstorms and had lost both engines. The NTSB determined that massive water ingestion into 
the engines accompanied by thrust lever movement induced severe stalling in, and major damage 
to, the engine compressor.
Epaion’s case library had no previous case of massive water ingestion. The system classified the 
accident in the category of “miscellaneous scenarios”, and retrieved as the most on-point case the 
accident of an Overseas National Airways DC-10-30 that took place on November 12, 1975 
[NTSB-AAR-76-19]. The fault in the retrieved case was bird ingestion. Because the retrieved case 
did not achieve a high degree o f similarity with the Southern Airways case the system correctly 
assumed that the current fault was an abstraction o f  the fault in the retrieved case. Epaion deter­
mined that the current fault was foreign object ingestion. The transfer of the causal links from the
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retrieved causal explanation was sufficient to explain completely all the symptoms in the Southern 
Airways case.
Case 6:
The symptoms observed during Boeing’s test flight F5 [Shontz 1992] were presented to Epaion. 
This was a case of heavy damage due to ice ingestion. Epaion correctly classified the case as an 
icing scenario. Under this category the case library had two other scenarios, A scenario of moder­
ate ice ingestion was retrieved as the most on-point case, and based on that scenario the system 
correctly assumed that the fault in the input case was ice-ingestion.
The transfer o f the causal explanation from the retrieved case to the input case was sufficient to 
explain all the symptoms in the input case except for the abnormal behavior of the rotational speed 
of the fan and the presence o f broad-band vibration. Both of these symptoms were absent from the 
retrieved case, since the retrieved case was an instance of moderate ice ingestion, whereas the 
input case was an instance of heavy ice-ingestion. By utilizing the causal dependencies portion of 
its model, Epaion was able to explain that the abnormal behavior of the rotational speed of the fan 
was attributed to the abnormality of the fuel flow. Lack o f relevant knowledge in the systems’ 
causal submodel and abstraction hierarchy made Epaion unable to explain the presence of the 
broad-band vibration.
Table 1 presents a summary o f the results. The first two columns identify each scenario that was 
presented to Epaion as an input case. The following two columns identify the appropriate classifi­
cation of the accident/incident along with the actual fault as determined by either the NTSB, the 
British Air Investigations Branch, or Boeing’s test data. The fifth and sixth columns present the 
classification o f each accident/incident done by Epaion along with the fault assumed by Epaion.
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The last column tabulates the result of Epaion’s adaptation phase. Epaion’s explanatory perfor­
mance was characterized as complete in the cases where the system was able to causally justify 
every symptom experienced in the input case.
Case
Identification
Correct
Classification
Correct
Fault
Epaion’s
Classification
Epaion’s
Fault
Epaion’s
Explanation
1 G-OBMG Rotor
Scenario
Fan Blade Rotor
Scenario
Fan Blade Complete
2 American 
Airlines 566
Rotor
Scenario
Turbine
Blade
Rotor Sce­
nario
Fan Blade Complete
3 China Air 006 Fuel
Scenario
Fuel
Controller
Fuel
Scenario
Fuel Sub­
system
Complete
4 Galunggung Volcanic
Scenario
Volcanic
Ingestion
Volcanic
Scenario
Volcanic
Ingestion
Complete
5 Southern 
Airways 242
Water
Scenario
Water
Ingestion
Miscellaneous
Scenario
Foreign
Object
Ingerstion
Complete
6 Boeing Test 
Flight F5
Icing
Scenario
Ice
Ingestion
Icing
Scenario
Ice
Ingestion
Incomplete
5.4.3 D iscussion
Automation of inflight dia- and prognosis as an aid to the flight crew has great potential for 
improving the general safety of civil transport operations. The Epaion case-based reasoning sys­
tem we have developed for the puipose of performing fault diagnosis and prognosis of aircraft in 
operation uses a hybrid reasoning process based on a library o f previous cases and several models 
o f the aircraft as basis for the reasoning process. This arrangement provides the methodology with 
the flexibility and power of first-principle reasoners, coupled with the speed of asscciational sys­
tems.
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We have evaluated the system’s performance empirically on six actual accidents/incidents. The 
results achieved are very promising for the future success of the system. Based on the results we 
make the following observations.
* Classification
Five of the six cases in this evaluation were correctly classified. Case No. 5, involving water 
ingestion, was classified under the category of miscellaneous scenarios due to the lack of previ­
ously encountered water ingestion scenarios. This actually can not be considered misclassification 
since it is expected that scenario types that were not encountered by the system will classified as 
miscellaneous scenarios. This suggests that an expanded case library will enhance the systems 
classification capability and therefore offer better matches for each additional input case.
* Diagnosis
Epaion was able to correctly diagnose five of the six scenarios. The American Airlines Flight 566 
scenario (case 2) was properly classified as a rotor scenario but misdiagnosed as fan problem 
rather than turbine problem. This is a result of the fact that problems in the fan and problems in the 
turbine manifest themselves similarly, and therefore both kinds of faults are classified under the 
category of rotor scenarios. When case 2 was used as input case the system retrieved as the most 
on-point case the Dan Air incident, which is a fan blade scenario. With almost negligible differ­
ence in the degree of match between the input case and the relevant library cases, the second best 
match was the accident of a United Airlines Flight 611 that took place on July 19, 1970 [NTSB- 
AAR-72-9]. This is a turbine fault scenario and would have achieved a higher degree of similarity 
with the input case if  the time order of the symptoms in both cases had been represented more pre­
cisely. All symptoms used in reconstructing the case of the United Airlines Flight 611 were based
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on expert opinion, but none was explicitly stated in the NTSB report. With the exception of the 
behavior of the EGT, the same holds for the symptoms used to reconstruct the American Airlines 
Flight 566 scenario. This suggests that presenting the system with cases which are reconstructed 
based on an accurate set of symptoms is vital for correct matching and therefore correct diagnoses.
* Symptom explanation
In five of the cases presented as input Epaion was able to explain all of the symptoms experienced. 
Failure to explain the presence of broad-band vibration in the last case (case 6) is attributed to lim­
ited information in the abstraction hierarchy. If the fact that broad-band vibration is a manifesta­
tion of fan abnormality had been included in the abstraction hierarchy, the system’s functional 
dependencies model would have explained the broad-band vibration symptom as a result of fan 
blade damage. The same result would have been achieved if the system had previously experi­
enced other cases with broad-band vibration, thus enabling the causal submodel to explain the 
vibration. It is evident that the more knowledge that the system contains in its abstraction hierar­
chy, the better its explanation capability will be. Current efforts are accordingly focused on 
expanding this knowledge to have a substantial size.
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Discussion
6.1 Contributions
[Michie 1971] presents the following criteria that constitute necessary conditions for a program to 
be characterized as intelligent.
• The program should utilize a model of its task environment.
• The program should use its model to form plans of action to be executed in the task 
environment.
• These plans should include directed sampling of the task environment so as to guide 
execution along conditional branches o f the plan.
• The program should re-formulate a plan when execution leads to states o f the environ­
ment which were not predicted in the model.
The program should utilize the record of failures and successes o f past plans to revise 
and extent the model inductively.
The dominant characteristic of these criteria is the presence and use of a model in the program’s 
task environment. The CBR paradigm demonstrates promising results in areas such as planning, 
design and memory organization, but its success is limited due to the lack of deep domain knowl­
edge. In the few cases where CBR is used in conjunction with deep domain knowledge the tech­
niques employed are specific to the particular application and domain.
This thesis investigates the use o f models in conjunction with a CBR methodology for physical 
system faults, and provide useful insights into the challenges and benefits of such a hybrid reason­
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ing methodology. Tb demonstrate the methodology a prototypical system has being designed and 
developed in the domain of aircraft faults. Actual aircraft accident cases were used and analytical 
and empirical results have been presented. In summary the following has been achieved :
• A mathematical formalization of the case-based reasoning paradigm has been developed. 
This formalization provides a precise definition and description o f the CBR paradigm, in 
contrast to present specifications, which consist o f either lengthy and imprecise verbal 
descriptions, or of impenetrable LISP code. In addition, the existence of a formal model 
opens the possibility o f a theoretical treatment of the subject Tb gain precision and 
expressiveness we developed a formal specification of the memory organization and vari­
ous phases o f the CBR reasoning paradigm.
• For similar reasons the model-based reasoning paradigm was formalized. The initial for­
malization focuses on causal models.
• A formal mathematical definition of the functions required for interfacing the CBR com­
ponent with the model-based component of this reasoning methodology was nrovited. 
Such interface functions are required during the phases of matching, and adaptation.
• The methodology was tested by designing and implementing a prototypical system for 
dealing with physical system faults. The system entails the use o f case-based methodology 
in conjunction with device models that describe the physical system’s structural, func­
tional, and causal behavior.
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6.2 Limitations
The research presented in this thesis has a number limitations. Our methodology suffers from the 
fact that the set of abnormalities that the physical system may experience along with the various 
ways that each abnormality manifests itself must be enumerated. If the input case demonstrates an 
abnormality that is not predefined in the abstraction hierarchy, or if the abnormality takes a value 
that is not predefined, then the system is unable to reason. For example, in order for the system to 
proceed with its the normal reasoning cycle when the input includes the information that the rota­
tional speed of the fan is high in the abstraction hierarchy it must be defined rotational speed o f the 
fan  is one of the things that can be abnormal and that high is one of the ways that an abnormality 
manifests itself. Currently the only way to compensate for this deficiency is to carefully and 
clearly define all the relevant characteristics of a particular domain before this methodology is 
applied to this domain.
An objection to our methodology might be raised in that the behavior of the physical system that 
the reasoner is called to reason upon is required to be represented in terms o f time episodes 
divided into four subphascs. This restriction stems from the fact that the monitoring of most phys­
ical systems is incomplete and available library cases do not contain continuous information of the 
behavior of the physical system. In the aircraft domain, dividing the abnormal behavior of the 
engine into four episodes has produced satisfactory results. Further research must investigate the 
issues associated with reasoning with cases of uneven duration divided into various episodes, each 
of which has uneven duration as well.
Another handicap o f our methodology is its current inability to recognize and deal with multiple 
faults. Multiple independent faults in a physical system, although uncommon, are always a possi­
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bility. In the section on future work we describe a possible extension of our methodology that 
would recognize and deal with situations where multiple faults occur.
As with other systems which reason based on previous cases, Epaion reasons even in the event 
that the case library contains only one case. This becomes a problem if  the only case in the library 
case is unrelated to the input case. A simple solution to this is to require that no case may be 
retrieved from the case library unless it exhibits a a level of similarity which is higher than a given 
threshold value. An even better approach to the problem is to never allow the system to reason 
unless it has been trained with several cases.
6.3 Future Work
The work presented in this thesis may be improved and extended in various ways.
6.3.1 Representing MOPs in U M A P
Currently each case in Epaion is represented in a memory organization packet (MOP) as imple­
mented in [Riesbcck & Schank 1989]. This implementation uses a set of tables that maintain links 
between MOPs such as specialization links, abstraction links, slots etc.
MOPs may be represented using the abstract data structures of LIMAP [Feyock and Karamouzis 
1992], This can be done by defining a sparse N x N  symbolic matrix, where N is the number of 
MOPs. An entry in location i j  denotes that MOP i is the specialization of MOP j and vice verse 
(j is the abstraction of i). Finding the set of all abstraction MOPs for i is as easy as scanning
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through row i, and scanning through column j gives all the specialization MOPs of j. All other 
basic operations on MOPs may be based on this matrix. This representation would result in effi­
cient operations on MOPs and efficient memoiy utilization. Additionally it would provide to the 
developers o f the system with a better way to visualize the links between the MOPs and compre­
hend the reasoner’s memory structure.
6.3.2 Prognostication
Automating the process o f predicting the future behavior o f physical systems is a difficult task 
because physical faults manifest themselves in various ways and it is difficult to enumerate all 
possible consequences. Current efforts to incorporate prognostication features in diagnostic sys­
tems that reason from physical system models succeed in predicting the expected course events, 
but are limited by the level o f detail of their models [Feyock & Karamouzis 1991]. For example, a 
model-based reasoning system that has a model of an aiiplane’s functional and physical connec­
tions among components may, after establishing that the fan in the left engine is the faulty compo­
nent, predict that the fault will affect the operation of the compressor since there is a functional 
link between the two components. Such a system is incapable, however, o f deducing that flying 
fragments from the faulty fan may penetrate the fuselage and damage the right engine. Humans, 
on the other hand, are good at making such predictions, since their reasoning is based not only on 
pre-existing models of the world, but also on previous directly or vicariously experienced events 
which remind them of the current situation.
The nature o f reasoning that takes place in CBR systems resembles the human ability of being 
reminded; CBR systems therefore offer a prognostication capability similar to the one that humans 
demonstrate. This capability, however, is limited to the knowledge contained in the retrieved case.
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The methodology presented in this thesis offers a prognostication ability that is beyond the capa­
bilities o f  conventional CBR systems. This ability stems from the existence and utilization of the 
models. For example, having achieved a match of the current situation with a previous case where 
the faulty component was a malfunctioning fuel controller, the system will hypothesize that the 
same fault is occurring. By referencing the world model it is able to predict that an engine flame- 
out may occur, although that did not happen in the retrieved case, because the model may have 
recorded at least one previous instance where this happened. The operator is provided with a list o f 
possible consequences o f the fault along with a frequency count of each one.
6.3.3 Multiple Independent Faults
This thesis offers a reasoning methodology for dealing with abnormal behavior of physical sys­
tems in operation, but always assumes that the observed symptoms derive from a single fault. Our 
work can be extended to recognize multiple independent faults in the following way: When the 
retrieved case fails to explain some o f the observed symptoms the system may stand by for addi­
tional symptoms, or search the case library again for an additional match that will explain the 
remaining symptoms. If a new case is found, its causal explanation will be used as if these symp­
toms were the result o f another fault. Using the model the system will try to establish a relation 
between the two faults by searching for a causal, structural, or functional link between them. If  no 
link is found it may be assumed that the system is experiencing multiple faults. In this situation the 
rcasoner may retrieve an additional case from the library, one that would explain the additional 
symptoms.
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6.3.4 Simulation and the Physical M odel
6 3  Future Work
We have indicated that our methodology uses a physical dependency digraph as one of its models. 
This is a makeshift measure, however, due to the fact that physical fault propagation, being the 
result of catastrophic component failures, is highly unpredictable. One expedient for dealing with 
this unpredicatability is to refer to previous cases, as Epaion does; another is to utilize spatial sim­
ulation models (SSMs) to determine the effect of uncontrolled energy releases. [Feyock & Li, 
1990, 1992] describe the use of SSMs to predict both fluidic and energy leaks. These models, 
which are easily interfaced with host systems, require only the identity of the faulty component, 
which can be supplied by Epaion. The SSM then looks in the component database to determine the 
location and type o f the component. If the component is of a type that can cause a fluid or energy 
leak, the system uses this information to set the initial conditions for the simulation. The simula­
tion is then run, and the physical propagation paths predicted by the SSM are extracted from the 
run data.
In addition to addressing Hie chaotic nature of physical propagation, the use of simulation models 
in conjunction with more traditional reasoning systems is prompted by a belief that deriving 
answers to real-world questions by setting up the initial conditions of simulation models, running 
the simulations, and extracting information from the results of the run, constitutes a powerful but 
underutilized mode o f operation for AI systems.
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6.4 Conclusion
We have described a case-based reasoning methodology for fault diagnosis and prognosis o f phys­
ical systems in operation. A hybrid reasoning process based on a library of previous cases and a 
model of the physical system is used as basis for the reasoning process. This arrangement provides 
the methodology with the flexibility and power of first-principle reasoners, coupled with the speed 
of associational systems. Although domain independent, this work is being tested in the domain of 
aircraft systems fault dia- and prognosis with very promising initial results.
A major concern of this project has been to create a system capable of achieving a practically use­
ful level o f performance on a case base of significant size, thereby avoiding the "toy problem" trap 
besetting many AI systems. The extensive use o f a classification hierarchy allows the system to 
achieve 0(log n) search times, while the information abstraction attendant on accident reconstruc­
tion produces space-efficient representations. The system is currently hosted on a desktop personal 
computer, and is estimated to be capable of storing the full set of propulsion-related aircraft acci­
dent for the last 20 years. These considerations, together with the encouraging level of success 
achieved by Epaion, support the expectation that this system will prove to be an effective contrib­
utor to aircraft safety.
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Appendix A
LIMAP: A modeling tool
A.l Introduction
A representation is a set of syntactic and semantic conventions that make it possible to describe 
things. Experience has shown that designing a good representation is often the key to turning hard 
problems into simple ones. According to [Winston 1984] good representations:
Make important things explicit
• Expose natural constraints, facilitating some class of computations
• Are complete and concise
Facilitate computation. We can store and retrieve information rapidly.
• Suppress detail.
• Are computable by an existing procedure.
All representations must provide some way to denote objects and to describe the relations that 
hold among them. Consequently, many representations are built around some form of semantic 
net, since semantic nets denote objects and describe relations among them.
Most AI search/representation techniques are oriented toward a potentially infinite domain of 
objects and arbitrary relations among them. Experience has shown that in reality much of what 
needs to be represented in AI can be expressed using a finite domain and unary or binary predi­
cates. Unary predicates can describe object attributes and binary predicates describe relations 
among two objects.
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Well-known vector- and matrix-based representations are appropriate for finite domains and 
unary/binary predicates, since they satisfy the above-mentioned properties of a "good” representa­
tion, and allow the extraction of path information by generalized transitive closurc/path matrix 
computations. In this scheme vectors are used for unary relations and matrices for binary relations. 
Unfortunately as the number of objects increases the size of matrices rapidly surpasses the amount 
of available memory in most machines.
Overcoming memory limitations raises the need for abstract data types to represent sparse matri­
ces. These are well suited for most applications, since semantic nets usually represent a limited 
number of connections among objects, even when working in laige domains.
A.2 Matrices and Semantic Nets
A directed graph (digraph) is a 2-tuple <N, E>, where N  is a finite set o f nodes, and E a finite set of 
edges. An edge is a member <a, b> of N x  N. A labeled digraph is a 3-tuple <N, E, L>, where N is 
as before, L is a finite set of labels, and E is a finite set o f labeled edges, with labels in L. A labeled 
edge (with label in L) <a, 1, b> is a member of N x L x N.
It is easy to see that digraphs arc a graphic representation of binary predicates over finite domains. 
If P(x, y) is a predicate over domain D x  D, then digraph G = <N, E> represents P if P(a, b) iff 
<a, b> e  E.
Whereas an unlabcled digraph can represent a single predicate, labeled digraphs whose label set is 
a set of predicate names can represent multiple binary predicates over the same domain D x D 
simply by letting edge <a, p, b> denote the fact that predicate p(a, b) is true; the absence o f such an
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edge denotes that p(a, b) is false. Extending the notation, we allow edges to be labeled with sets o f 
predicate names; an edge <a, {pt , ..., pn), b> is an abbreviation for the set of edges 
<a, pi, b > ,..., <a, pn, b>. Labeled digraphs thus correspond to the familiar semantic net construct 
of AI.
Given the problem of representing a unary predicate P(x) over a finite domain D o f fixed size n, an 
obvious and familiar solution is to use boolean vectors, a.k.a. bit strips: for any di in D, P(dj) is 
true (false) iff the i'th component of the vector representing P is a 1 (0). Boolean operations such 
as AND, OR, and NOT on predicates over D are then representable by the corresponding opera­
tions over bit strips, which are efficient on most computers. Similarly, binary predicates Q(x, y) 
over D x D can be efficiently represented by N x N matrices whose ij element is 1 if Q(dj, dj) is 
true, else 0.
Boolean matrices can in principle represent labeled digraphs: a separate matrix is assigned to each 
label, and represents the subgraph of nodes connected by edges bearing that label. In practice this 
representation can become unwieldy. The number of different labels may be large, resulting in 
proliferation of adjacency matrices. Moreover, queries such as " is  there any path (regardless o f 
labels) from node a to node b?” require that the matrices for all labels be ORed together. An 
answer to the follow-up query "w hat are these paths?” is even more difficult to generate from this 
representation. Such considerations motivate the adoption of symbolic matrices as representation 
for labeled digraphs. Element ij o f a symbolic matrix is P iff the arrow from d; to dj in the semantic 
net has label P, else NIL.
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A.3 Implementation
LIMAP (Lisp-based MAtrix Processor) is a set of Common LISP [Steele 1984] procedures that 
define and manipulate a veclor/matrix-based knowledge representation. The user may represent 
relations among objects using boolean or symbolic matrices/vectors. These matrices/vectors are 
abstract data types that can represent data (boolean values or symbols) stored in arrays. The 
semantic interpretation of this data is left to the user.
As is the case for a traditional database system, LIMAP’s capabilities are invoked via a language 
interface that consists o f two parts. One is the data definition language (DDL) for specifying both 
the data the system is to contain as well as "metadata;" i.e. information about the structure and 
constraints that govern the data contained in the system. The other is the data manipulation lan­
guage (DML), the subset of the language concerned with the specification o f queries and updates 
on the data. We will categorize the LIMAP functions accordingly. As in Common LISP, LIMAP’s 
functions and arguments arc not case sensitive.
A.3.1 DD L Operations
Figure A .l shows LIMAP’s data definition procedures, and their associated syntax.
DEFREL <relname> <specs> <type> <rep>
DELREL <relname>
<relname> ::= <symbolic atom>
<lypc> ::= Bmatnx I Smatrix I Bvector ISvector 
<spccs> ::= (<length> <length>) I (<length>)
<lcngth> ::= <symbolic atom> 1 <integer>
<rep> ::= vector-rep I array-rep I sparse-rep
Figure 6.1: LIMAP's data definition procedures, and their associated syntax
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DEFREL
The function defrel defines a relationship with name relname of type type and having particular 
specifications. The actual data of the relation is stored in a system-generated variable and is repre­
sented according to the rep field. Valid representations are array, vector, and sparse representa­
tions. The representation is transparent to the user since s/he views all relationships according to 
their type attribute. Valid type attributes are boolean matrices/vectors (Bmatrix/Bvector) and sym­
bolic matrices/vectors (Smatrix/Svector). The specs field specifies the dimensions of the matrices/ 
vectors. Matrices are two-dimensional and vectors one-dimensional. When assigning the dimen­
sions of a relation the system expects a list with one or two numbers or symbols. For a matrix def­
inition the first number specifies the number o f rows and the second the number of columns. If  a 
symbol is specified the system expects that the symbol is the name of a set of values and substi­
tutes the size of the set for the symbol. Following the definition a change in the size of the set does 
not affect the dimensionality of the matrix/vector. Change of dimensionality is achieved via the 
RESIZE function, as is explained later. The following example defines a matrix named “exam- 
ple_mtrx" to be o f boolean type, have 4x4 elements represented as a list, a vector named "is_sen- 
sor” to be of type boolean and have size of nine elements, and a matrix named “engine” to be a 
symbolic matrix or size 9x9 and be represented as an array.
(setvar **comps* ‘(fan compressor combustor turbl turb2 N1 N2 EGT EPR))
(defrel ‘example_mtrx ‘(4 4) 'Bmalrix ‘sparse-rcp)
(defrel *is_sensor *(*comps*) ‘Bvector ‘vector-rep)
(defrel ‘engine ‘(9 *comps*) ‘Smatrix ‘array-rep)
Matrices/vectors o f boolean type are matrices/vectors where each of the elements is either a "0” or 
“1”, representing false or true respectively. The elements of matrices/vectors which are declared as 
symbolic can contain arbitrary s-cxpressions such as numbers, symbols, or lists. When a matrix is 
declared as having array-rep representation the matrix is associated with a Common LISP two­
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dimensional array, and every operation on the matrix (such as a retrieval, multiplication etc) is per­
formed on the two-dimensional array. A vector with a vector-rep representation is represented as a 
one-dimensional array. Matrices/vectors having a sparse-rep representation are represented as 
LISP lists. For example, if  cxam plejntrx has only two elements, say a value 1 in row 10, column 
30 and in row 33 column 90, then it is represented by the list ((10 30 I) (33 90 1)).
When a relation is defined using defrel it is placed in a system-maintained definition table which 
maintains information about all the defined relations. Additionally, a system-generated variable is 
bound to the data structure that will actually hold the data. This data structure is a list initialized to 
nil if the representation is sparse-rep. When the representation is array-rep the data structure is an 
array initialized with zeros or nil, depending on the type field. Matrices/vectors of boolean type are 
initialized to all zeros, and symbolic matrices/vectors to all nils. Figure A.2 shows the contents of 
the definition table after the above definitions. The path and flag fields are explained in a later sec­
tion during the description of thepaf/is operation.
NAME SPECS TYPE REP PATH FLAG
example__mtrx (4 4) Bmatrix sparse-rep PO T
is_sensor (*comps*) Bvector vector-rep None None
engine (9 ’•'comps*) Smatrix array-rep PI T
Figure 6.2: Contents of the Definition Table
DELREL
The operation Delrel deletes a relation by extracting it from the definition table and disassociating 
all data variables with the relation.
- 1 0 8 -
A LIMAP: A modeling tool 
DML Operations
A.3 Implementation
Using the data manipulation language (DML) procedures the user may query a relation’s type, 
specifications, representation, or the actual data stored. S/he may store/retrieve values to particular 
locations, multiply two matrices, copy one matrix to another, invert, transpose, resize, clear, or 
take the transitive closure o f a matrix. Figure A.3 tabulates the DML operations.
STORE and RETRIEVE
The function STORE allows the user to store a specific value to a particular location in some 
matrix/vector. The user must specify the matrix/vector name, the value to be stored and the coordi­
nates of the location in row-major order. The function returns the stored value. An error is returned 
when there is a type mismatch between the value to be stored and the type of the matrix/vector. 
RETRIEVE retrieves the contents of a particular location in a matrix/vector. In the event that that 
the specified matrix/vector in not defined, both functions display an appropriate message and 
return nil.
Example: (STORE ‘engine ‘N 0 5) stores the symbol “N” in location (0 5) of the symbolic matrix 
“engine”, and returns “N”.
TYPE and REP
The functions TYPE and REP notify the user about the type and representation scheme o f a partic­
ular matrix. The possible return values o f Type are Bmatrix, Bvector, Smatrix and Svector. REP 
returns either array-rep, vector-rep or sparse-rep depending on the specified matrix/vector.
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Predicate Argl Arg2 Arg3 Arg4 Arg5 Description
DEFTABLE [:ALL] [T] Display definition table
DISPLAY relname Display a relation
TYPE relnamc Relation’s type
DIMS relname Relation’s dimensions
REP relname Relation’s representation
DATA relnamc Relation’s data
DATA-NAME relname Relation’s data variable
STORE relnamc value [row] column Store value
RETRIEVE relname [row] column Retrieve contents
TCLOSE relname Transitive closure
PATHS relname row column [:NAME] [T] All paths
MULT relnamel rclname2 relname3 Multiply
FRANSPOSE relname 1 relname2 Transpose
CLEAR relname Initializes a relation
COMPLEMENT relnamel relname2 Relation’s complement
RESIZE relnamc specs Changes the dimensions
COPYREL relnamel relname2 Copy rcll into reI2
COLUMN column relname veclname Copy a column into a vector
ROW row relname vectname Copy a row into a vector
RELAND relnamel relname2 relname3 Logical AND
RELOR relnamel relname2 relname3 Logical OR
Figure 6.3: LIMAPs DML operations 
Example: (TYPE ‘engine) and (REP ‘engine) return Smatrix and array-rep respectively.
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DIMS, DATA and DATA-NAME
A.3 Implementation
The function DIMS returns a list o f the dimensions of a specified matrix/vector. This list contains 
one number, the number of elements, for a vector and two numbers, the number of rows and the 
number o f columns, when the specified structure is a matrix. Functions DATA and DATA-NAME, 
respectively, return the data structure and the symbolic name o f the data structure that holds the 
actual data of the specified abstracted matrix/vector. All of the above functions terminate grace­
fully with an appropriate message when the specified matrix/vector is not defined.
Example: (DIMS ‘engine) returns (9 9) and (DIMS ‘engin) returns nil and displays the message 
“*** From LIMAP, engin is not defined”.
(DATA-NAME ‘engine) returns “engine", while (DATA ‘engine) returns
nil N nil nil N N nil nil nil
nil nil N N nil nil N nil nil
nil nil nil N nil nil nil nil nil
nil N nil nil N nil nil nil nil
N nil nil nil nil nil nil N N
nil nil nil nil nil nil nil nil nil
nil nil nil nil nil nil nil nil nil
nil nil nil nil nil nil nil nil nil
nil nil nil nil nil nil nil nil nil
MULT
MULT is a function that allows the user to multiply two matrices,, a matrix and a vector or two 
vectors o f the same type. The resulting matrix/vector is placed in a user-specified matrix/vector,
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which constitutes the third argument in the function. If the specified matrices/vectors are not 
defined, have incompatible types, or incompatible dimensions the function terminates gracefully 
by displaying appropriate error messages. MULT operates on the following principle.
For boolean matrices/vectors such as b l an m x  n, and b2 an n x  r (MULT *b1 ‘b2 *b3):
b3[ij] = Y '/ChiN.b]. W J )
h=l
where f(x,y) = 1 if both x,y are 1, else 0 
For symbolic matrices/vectors such as si an m x  n, and s2 an n x r (MULT *sl ‘s2 ‘s3):
s3[ij] = y /(s ltilh ]’s2th,i])
h = l
where f(x,y) = t if both x,y are non-nil, else nil
Examples: The following shows the contents of exam plejntrx before and after the operation 
(MULT ‘example_mtrx ‘example_mtrx ‘example_mtrx).
n
n
Before: After:
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
1 1 1 1  
1 1 1 11
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Assuming that S 1, S2, and S3 are 4 x  4 symbolic matrices, the following shows the contents of S 1, 
S2, and S3 after the operation (MULT ‘SI ‘S2 'S3).
SI: S2:
a nil nil nil b b
a nil nil nil nil nil
a nil nil nil nil nil
a nil nil nil nil nil
S3:
b b t t t t
nil nil t t t t
nil nil t t t t
nil nil t t t t
TRANSPOSE and COMPLEMENT
The functions TRANSPOSE and COMPLEMENT respectively transpose and complement a spec­
ified matrixArector. TRANSPOSE works only on matrices, and COMPLEMENT inverts zeroes to 
ones and vice-versa on boolean matrices/vectors. The resulting complemented matrix/vector
replaces the specified matrix/vector, but the result o f the transposition is placed in a new matrix
specified by the user. Successful termination of the above functions returns true.
Examples: The following shows the contents of examplejntrx  before and after the operation 
(TRANSPOSE 'example_mtrx ‘example_mtrx).
Before: After:
1 . 1 1 1 .
1 . . . . .
The contents of exam plejntrx before and after the operation (COMPLEMENT ‘example_mtrx 
‘example_mtnc) is as follows:
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Before: After:
1 . 1 1 1
1 . 1 1 1
1 . 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
CLEAR and COPYREL
CLEAR initializes the contents of a specified abstracted matrix/vector. Matrices/vectors of a bool­
ean type are initialized to all zeroes and matrices/vectors of symbolic type to all nils. COPYREL 
copies one matrix/vector to another. Both arguments must be of the same type and have the same 
representation. The first argument is the source and the second the destination.
RESIZE
The function RESIZE changes the dimensions o f a specified matrix/vector. The first argument is 
the specified matrix/vector and the second a list containing the new dimensions. After a RESIZE 
operation that increases the size of the matrix/vector the matrix/vector retains its elements and the 
newly created locations are initialized with the default values. The newly created locations are 
appended at the ends of vectors, and the right and bottom margins o f matrices. A RESIZE opera­
tion that decreases dimension sizes drops higher indexed elements. Thus following a RESIZE 
operation where the new dimensions are smaller than the previous if the users tries to access loca­
tions that don’t exist the operation returns nil and prints an out of range error message. Example: If 
the contents of vector is_senxor (defined previously as a boolean vector of size 9) is:
Location: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
Contents: 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
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then after the operation (RESIZE *is_sensor '(11)) the contents o f the same vector will be: 
Location: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
Contents: 0 0 0 0 0 1  1 1 1 0 0
RELAND and RELOR
The logical functions RELAND and RELOR perform the logical AND  and OR among two vec­
tors/matrices. These vectors/matrices must be of a boolean type and have the same size. The result 
of either function becomes the contents of the third aigument.
Example: The following shows the result of (RELAND ‘example_mtrx *other_mtrx ‘result_mtrx), 
where the contens o f examplejntrx and otherjntrx is:
example other result
mtrx: mtrx: mtrx:
When examplejntrx and other jn tr x  have the same contents as above, then following the opera­
tion (RELOR ‘example_mtrx 'olher_mtrx ‘rcsultjntrx) the contents o f result jn tr x  is:
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
example
mtrx:
other
mtrx:
result
mtrx:
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
11
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DISPLAY, SHOW-ARRAY, and DEFTABLE
LIMAP provides the user with functions that allow him/her to view the contents of matrices/vec­
tors. DISPLAY produces a formatted display of a matrix or a vector. In case the abstracted data 
types are of symbolic type an "S” is displayed at the location that a symbol exists. In order to see 
the actual symbols SHOW-ARRAY should be used. The function DEFTABLE displays the con­
tents of the definition tabic, which contains all the defined matrices/vectors and their associated 
attributes.
Example: The outputs of (DISPLAY ‘enginea) and (SHOW-ARRAY ‘enginea) are as follows: 
(DISPLAY ‘enginea)(SHOW-ARRAY ‘enginea).
(DISPLAY ‘enginea) (SHOW-ARRAY ‘enginea)
0: . S . • s  s  . . . nil 1 nil nil 1 1 nil nil nil
1: . . S s . . s  . . nil nil 1 1 nil nil 1 nil nil
2: * ♦  ♦ s ......................... nil nil nil 1 nil nil nil nil nil
3: . S . s  . . . . nil 1 nil nil 1 nil nil nil nil
4: s . . . s  s 1 nil nil nil nil nil nil 1 1
5: nil nil nil nil nil nil nil nil nil
6: nil nil nil nil nil nil nil nil nil
7: nil nil nil nil nil nil nil nil nil
8: nil nil nil nil nil nil nil nil nil
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A.3 Implementation
The TCLOSE and PATHS operations form the core of LIMAP’s path manipulation capability. The 
function TCLOSE calculates the transitive closure of a specific matrix. The transitive closure of a 
matrix M is a matrix M* that contains an entry in location <a, b> iff the directed graph represented 
by M contains a path (of length 0 or greater) from a to b. In LIMAP M* inherits M ’s type and rep­
resentation attributes. Warshall’s Algorithm is an efficient method for computing M*t given a 
matrix M. Intuitively, the algorithm scans the matrix top to bottom, left to right. If  an entry is 
encountered, say in row i, column j, then row i is replaced by row i OR row j, and the scan contin­
ues from position ij. Figure 4 shows the code that performs the transitive closure for boolean and 
symbolic matrices using Warshall’s Algorithm.
(DEFUN BTclose (rel); Function to compute transitive
(LET ((max (FIRST (dims rel))); closure of a boolean matrix 
(DO ((k 0 (+ k 1))) ((= k max) nil); Scan top to bottom 
(DO ((i 0 (+ i 1))) ((= i max) nil); Scan left to right 
(COND ((= (retrieve rel i k) 1); If there is an entry 
(DO ((j 0 (+ j  1))) ((= j  max) nil)
(store rel (LOGIOR (retrieve rel i j); Swap i and j  
(retrieve rel k j)) i j))
) ; Close DO
) ; Close COND
) ; Close DO
) ; Close DO
) ; Close LET 
) ; Close BTclose
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(DEFUN STclose (rel); Function to compute transitive
(LET ((max (FIRST (dims rel))); closure of a symbolic matrix 
(DO ((k 0 (+ k 1))) ((= k max) nil); Scan top to bottom 
(DO ((i 0 (+ i 1))) ((= i max) nil); Scan left to right
(COND ((NOT (NULL (retrieve rel i k))); If there is an entry 
(DO ((j 0 (+j  1») ((= j  max) nil)
(COND ((NOT (NULL (OR
(retrieve rel i j); If there is a symbol in (i, j)
(retrieve rel k j)))); OR in (k, j)
(store rel t i j))); Then flag that (i,j) are connected 
) ; Close DO
) ; Close COND
) ; Close DO
) ; Close DO
) ; Close LET
) ; Close STclose
Figure 6.4: Code for transitive closure
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Example: Let us assume that we have a network of four nodes labeled as 0, 1, 2, and 3. Assume
Figure 6.5: Example network
that there are direct connections from 0 to 1, 0 to 2, 1 to 2, 2 to 3, and 1 to 3 as indicated in 
Figure A.5. The following displays how the network may be represented in a boolean matrix along 
with the contents o f the same matrix after the transitive closure has been computed.
Exampte mtrx: A fter (TC LO SE
‘exam plejntrx):
1 1 1 
1 1 
1
A value o f 1 in locations ( 0 ,1), (0,2), (1,2), (1,3), and (2, 3) means that there is a direct connec­
tion between the corresponding nodes. Following the operation o f transitive closure a value of 1 in 
location (i, j) means that there is a connection from node i to node j .  This connection may be direct 
or indirect. An example of indirect connection is the connection between node 0 and 3. Such a 
connection is achieved via node 1 or node 2 (Figure A.5).
1 1 
1 1 
1
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Assuming that LIMAP’s matrices (boolean or symbolic) represent directed graphs, the function 
PATHS returns all the paths between two specific nodes in a network. Besides the user-defined 
attributes that characterize each matrix in LIMAP, every matrix is associated with an internal sys­
tem matrix called the path matrix, and a flag  field. When PATHS is invoked for the first time on a 
particular matrix it does the following. First, using an extension of Warshall’s Algorithm, all possi­
ble paths among every node in the matrix are calculated. A path is a list of node numbers. Tne 
resulting lists of paths become the entries of the associated path matrix and the flag is set to nil. At 
the end only the paths among the two specific nodes specified by the user are returned. A subse­
quent request for paths need not recalculate all the paths, but merely retrieve the appropriate entry 
from the path matrix. In case that there is a change in the contents of the user defined matrix (i.e. a 
change in the graph) the flag field is set to “t" and a subsequent user request for paths triggers a 
recalculation of the path matrix.
In order to operate on a symbolic matrix and produce a path matrix whose ij entry contains the set 
of all paths from node i to node j, WarshaH’s algorithm was extended as Figure 6 indicates.
Let M be an NxN square matrix
for k=l to N ; Scan from top down 
for i=l to N ; Scan from left to right 
i f ( i * k  AND M[i,k] *  ni l ) then 
for j= l to N
M [ijJ := UNION ( M[i,j], LINK( M[i,k], M [k.j]))
Figure 6.6: Warshall’s Algorithm
In the algorithm of Figure 6, UNION is the normal union operation on sets and LINK operates on
lists o f paths. If p, q are paths where p = (vj vk) and q = (vk, . .. ,  vr) then LINK (p,q) returns
(V |, . . . ,v k, ... ,v T).
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More precisely: let E(k) denote the set of all paths going through nodes numbered < k only (not 
including the endpoints, which can be arbitrary). Then the original adjacency matrix represents 
E(0). More precisely, the original matrix has the list ((i j)) in element ij if  there is an arrow from i 
to j,  otherwise nil. (This discussion assumes vertices numbered from 1, although Common Lisp 
dimensions are actually indexed from 0; in that case, the original matrix would represent E(-l).) 
Warshall’s Algorithm scans the matrix from top to bottom, left to right. The scan of the k ’th col­
umn computes E(k), as follows. When a non-nil element is encountered in an off-diagonal position 
in column k, say at ik, that clement will be a list of E(k-l)-paths from node i to node k. Consider 
arbitrary element ij of row i; it contains all E(k-l)-paths (if any) from i to j. Now that we also know 
the E(k-l)-paths from i to k, we can reach j  from i either by the E(k-1) paths in ij, or by going from 
node i to node k, and then from node k to node j  by any path (if any) in element kj. Such paths will, 
o f course, be E(k) paths. Thus we add to the paths already at ij the link of all paths from i to k and 
all paths from k to j.
Example: Assume that symbolic jn tr x  is a 4 x  4 symbolic matrix that represents the network of 
Figure 5. If the contents of symbolic jn tr x  is as follows, then (PATHS 'example_mtrx 0 1) returns 
"(0 1)’’, and (PATHS *symbolic_mtrx 0 3) returns “((01 3) (0 2 3) (0 1 2 3))”. The contents o f sym­
bolic jn tr x  and the internally maintained path matrix are:
symbolic_mlrx: corresponding path matrix:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0: nil 1 1 nil 0: nil ((0 1)) ((0 2)) ((0 1 3) (0 2 3) (0 1 2 3))
1: nil nil 1 1 1: nil « 1  2)) ( d  3))
2: nil nil nil 1 2: nil nil nil ((2 3))
3: nil nil nil nil 3: nil nil nil nil
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Following our exemplar definitions, Figure 7 displays the contents of the definition table including 
the attributes of each path matrix (compare with figure 2). This is achieved by using the optional 
all flag of the DEFTABLE function, i.e by calling (DEFTABLE rail t). In the path field o f the table 
is stored the name of the associated path matrix. The associated path matrices have no value in the 
flag field.
NAME TYPE SPECS REP PATH FLAC
0: example_mtrx (4 4) B matrix sparse-rep P0 T
1: P0 (4 4) Bmatrix sparse-rep None None
2: is_sensor (*comps*) Bvector vector-rep None None
3: engine (9 * comps*) Smatrix array-rep PI T
4: PI (9 *comps*) Smatrix array-rcp None None
Figure 6.7: Contents of the definition table
A.3.3 Control Structures
Queries of the form “is there a relation R such that nodes a and b are in relation R? “is there a path 
from x to y? a path fulfilling constraint C? where can I go from x? how can I get to x?” arise fre­
quently both in AI and elsewhere. Such queries, which involve quantification over relations, corre­
spond to statements in the second-order predicate calcultis. This section describes the control 
structures that make LIMAP an efficient second-order predicate calculus programming system.
The distinction between procedural and non-procedural predicate calculus specifications blurs if 
the underlying domain is finite, since the FORALL and EXISTS quantifiers map in an obvious 
way to loops ranging over the domain elements. It has been our goal to give the LIMAP data 
manipulation language as non-procedural a character as possible. In particular, LIMAP notation is 
an adaptation of the (function-less) predicate calculus, with extensions to allow data retrieval in
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addition to data specification. For example, a “yes” answer to (EXISTS X) (FORALL Y) P(X,Y) 
is insufficient; the actual X-value must be retrieved. We have found that minimal modifications of 
the control macros described in [Chamiaket al., 1987] were suitable for the task of expressing the 
required quantifications. Following is a summary of the general form of the control structure 
implemented by these macros:
(FOR (<variable\> :IN <set\>)
(<variable^> :IN <jetn>)
[:WHEN <when-expression>]
<FOR-keyword> <expressioit\> . . .  <expressionn>)
The expression\ following FOR-keyword are called the body o f the FOR. The construct (<vari- 
able\> :IN <setf>) causes the variable to iterate over the elements of the set, which may be speci­
fied as a list, a vector, or a matrix row or column. When there are several sets the FOR interates 
over the elements of each set in the following way. Initially the first element o f each set is assigned 
to the corresponding variablej and the body of the FOR is evaluated. Then the second element of 
each set is assigned to the corresponding variable\ and the body is evaluated again. This is 
repeated until some set runs out o f elements or the final value of the FOR is determined as gov­
erned by the FOR-keyword.
FOR-keywords
: ALWAYSretum true if all the values of body are true 
:FILTERproduce a list of the non-nil values of body 
:FIRSTproduce the first non-nil value of body 
:SAVEproduce a list of all values of body
While the description of these constructs is procedural in form, the effect when programming in 
this notation is that o f writing FORALLs and EXISTS, with the proviso that any variable values
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that are found to "EXIST” are collected in accordance with the FOR-keyword and returned as 
value. The following section contains an example application of LIMAP.
A.4 Conclusion
We have described a programming system oriented toward efficient information representation/ 
manipulation over fixed finite domains, and quantification over paths and predicates. The initial 
motivation for the creation o f such a system was the fact that the need for such operations arose 
frequently in the domain o f diagnosis/prognosis generation problem domain. Since then it has 
become apparent that the facilities provided are applicable to problems both within and outside of 
AI.
Our experience to date has shown that LIMAP is applicable to a wide range o f problems. While 
LIMAP, if abused, is as capable of inefficient operation as any other misused programming sys­
tem, we have found that for every problem yet attempted there has existed a LIMAP formulation 
that was concise, comprehensible, and for which LIMAP’s facilities constituted an efficient prob­
lem representation.
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Appendix B
Case Library
B. 1 Fuel Metering Unit
This is a propulsion failure scenario staged at Boeing Inc. and reported in [Shontz et. al. 1992].
The failure is a malfunctioning valve in the fuel metering system.
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Fault scenario FI
; Flight Deck Engine Advisor, Boeing document D6-55880, May 1991 
»
{sctf +easel*
*(
; — Fault
(fault i-m-fucl-metering-unit)
(events m-group
(1 m-causal-event
(ante i-m-fuel-mctcring-unit)
(ensq i-m-fuel-flow))
(2 m-causal-cveni
(ante i-m-fucl-flow)
(ensq i-m-nl))
(3 m-causal-cvcnt 
(ante i-m-nl)
(ensq i-m-n2))
(4 m-causal-cvcnt 
(ante i-m-n2)
(ensq i-m-egl)))
(id “Boeing Test Flight F-l”)
(date“ l")
(airline “flight test data")
(flight “flight test data”)
(aircraft "flight test data")
; -- Context Variables
(phase-of-flight i-m-ground-start)
(weather i-m-clear)
(workload i-m-modcratc)
(enginc-commandcd-status i-m-start)
; — Symptoms
(egt m-group
(1 m-sensor-Tcading (status i-m-normal) (trend i-m-incTenscs))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-normal) (trend i-m-increases))
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high) (trend i-m-incTeascs))
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high) (trend i-m-inCTeases)))
(nl m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-normal) (trend i-m-increases))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-increases))
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-increases))
(4 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-stable)))
(n2 m-group
(1 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-increases))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-incrcoscs))
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-increases))
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-stable))) 
(fucl-flow m-group
(1 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-incrcascs))
(2 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-incrcascs))
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-increases))
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-stable)))
)
)
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B.2 Fuel Boost Pump
This is a propulsion failure scenario staged at Boeing Inc. and reported in [Shontz et. al. 1992]. An 
engine flameout occurred due to a fuel boost pump failure.
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(self *case2*
*(
; — Solution Data
(fault i*m-fuel-boost-pump)
(events m-group 
(1 m-causal-cvcnt
(ante i-m-fuel-boost-pump)
(ensq i-m-fucl-pressure))
(2 m-causal-evcnt
(ante i-m-fuel-pressure)
(ensq i-m-fuel-flow))
(3 m-causal-event
(ante i-m-fucl-flow)
(ensq i-m-nl))
(4 m-causal-cvcnt 
(ante i-m-nl)
(ensq i-m-n2)))
; — Id features
(id "Boeing Test Flight F-2")
(date "2”)
(airline "flight test data")
(flight “flight test data")
(aircraft "flight test data")
; — Context Variables
(phasc-of-flight i-m-cruisc)
(workload i-m-light)
(cngine-commandcd-status i-m-stcady)
; — Symptoms
(nl m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-normal})
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-normal))
(3 m-scnsor-Tcading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-dccrcascs)) 
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-dccreases))) 
(n2 m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-normal))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-normal))
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-decrcases)) 
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-decreascs))) 
(fuel-flow m-group
(1 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-normal))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-normal))
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-zcro))
(4 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-zero)))
(fuel-prcssure m-group
(1 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-decreascs)) 
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-decreascs)) 
(3 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-zcro))
(4 m-sensor-rcading (status i-m-zcro)))
)
)
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B.3 Ice Ingestion
This Is a propulsion failure scenario staged at Boeing Inc. and reported in [Shontz et. al. 1992].
The failure was a foreign object damage due to light ice ingestion.
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; Flight Deck Engine Advisor, Boeing document D6-55880, May 1991 
(sett *case3*
’(
; — Solution Data 
(fault i-m-ice-ingestion)
(events m-group 
(1 m-causal-cvcnt 
(ante i-m-ice-ingcstion)
(ensq i-m-fan-blade-damagc))
(2 m-causal-event
(ante i-m-fan-blade-damagc)
(ensq i-m-fon-rotor-imbalnncc))
(3 m-causal-event
(ante i-m-fan-rotor-imbalancc)
(ensq i-m-fan-vib))
(4 m-causal-event 
(ante i-m-fan-vib)
(ensq i-m-compressor-vib))
(5 m-causal-event 
(ante i-m-compTessor-vib)
(ensq i-m-thrust)))
(id "Boeing Test Right F-3")
(date “3’')
(airline “flight test data")
(flight “flight test data")
(aircraft “flight test data")
; — Context Variables 
(phase-of-flight i-m-climb-out)
(weather i-m-icing)
(workload i-m-moderalc)
(cngine-commandcd-status i-m-climb-powcr)
; — Symptoms 
(fan-vib m-group
(1 m-sensor-rcading (status i-m-high) (trend i-m-increases))) 
(compressor-vib m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high) (trend i-m-increases)))
(thrust m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low)))
(fan-vib-behavior-mop i-m-Iihhh)
(thrust-behavior-mop i-m-hhhh)
(compressor-vib-behavior-mop i-m-1111)
»
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B.4 Ice Ingestion
This is a propulsion failure scenario staged at Boeing Inc. and reported in [Shontz et. al. 1992], 
The failure was a foreign object damage due to moderate ice ingestion
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; Fault scenario F4
; Right Deck Engine Advisor, Boeing document D6-55880, May 1991 
i
(self *case4*
‘(
(fault i-m-ice-ingestion)
(events m-group
S I m-causal-event ante i-m-ice-ingestion)
(ensq i-m-fan-blade-damnge))
(2 m-causal-event
(ante i-m-fan-blade-damage)
(ensq i-m-fan-rotor-imbalance))
(3 m-causal-event
(ante i-m-fan-rotor-imbalance)
(ensq i-m-fan-vib))
(4 m-causal-event 
(ante i-m-fan-vib)
(ensq i-m-comprcssor-vib))
(5 m-causal-event 
(ante i-m-compressor-vib)
(ensq i-m-n2))
(6 m-causal-event 
(ante i-m-n2)
(ensq i-m-luel-flow))
(7 m-causal-event 
(ante i-m-n2)
(ensq i-m-egt))
(8 m-causal-event 
(ante i-m-fuel-flow)
(ensq i-m-thrust)))
; — id features
(id "Boeing Test Right F-4")
; — Context Variables
(phase-of-flighti-m-climb-out)
(weather i-m-icing)
(workload i-m-moderate)
(engme-commanded-status i-m-climb-powcr)
; — Symptoms
(compTessor-vib m-group 
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high)))
(thrust m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-increases))) 
(fan-vib m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high)))
(fuel-llow m-group 
(1 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-low))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low)))
(n2 m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-normal)))
(egt m-group
(1 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-low))
(2 m-scnsor-reading (status i-m-low)))
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B.5 Ice Ingestion
This is a propulsion failure scenario staged at Boeing Inc. and reported in [Shontz et. al. 1992], 
The failure was a foreign object damage due to heavy ice ingestion.
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; ~  Solution Data 
; (fault i-m-ice-ingestion)
; (events m-group 
; (1 m-causal-event 
; (ante i-m-icc-ingestion)
; (ensq i-m-fan-blade-damagc))
; (2 m-causal-event 
; (ante i-m-fan-blade-damagc)
; (ensq i-m-fan-rotor-imbalance))
; (3 m-causal-event 
; (ante i-m-fan-iotor-imbalance)
; (ensq i-m-broad-band-vib))
; (4 m-causal-event 
; (ante i-m-fan-rotor-imbalance)
; (ensq i-m-nl))
; (5 m-causal-event 
; (ante i-m-fan-rotor-imbalance)
; (ensq i-m-n2))
; (6 m-causal-event 
; (ante i-m-n2)
; (ensq i-m-fuel-flow))
; (7 m-causal-event 
; (ante i-m-fuel-flow)
; (ensq i-m-thnist))
; (8 m-causal-event 
; (ante i-m-n2)
; (ensq i-m-egt)))
(id "Boeing Test Flight F-5”)
(date "5”)
(airline "flight test data")
(flight "flight test data”)
(aircraft "flight test data”)
; — Context Variables 
(phase-of-flight i-m-cruise)
i weather i-m-icing) workload i-m-moderate) 
(engine-commanded-status i-m-climb-power)
; — Symptoms 
(nl m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-norma])))
(n2 m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low)))
(egt m-group
(1 m-sensor-rcading (status i-m-low))) 
(fuel-flow m-group 
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low)))
(thrust m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low))) 
(broad-band-vib m-group 
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high)))
)
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B.6 Volcanic Ash Ingestion
This is a propulsion failure scenario staged at Boeing Inc. and reported in [Shontz et. al. 1992]. An 
engine flameout occurred due to volcanic ash ingestion producing fuel nozzle clogging.
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; Fault scenario F6
; Flight Deck Engine Advisor, Boeing document D6-55880, May 1991 
(setf*casc6',,
‘(
; — Solution Data
(fault i-m-volcanic-ash-ingcstion)
(events m-group
(1 m-causal-cvcnt
(ante i-m-volcanic-ash-ingestion)
(ensq i-m-fan-blade-dnmnge))
(2 m-causal-event
(ante i-m-fan-blade-damagc)
(ensq i-m-fan-rotor-imbalancc))
(3 m-causal-event
(ante i-m-fan-rotor-imbalance)
(ensq i-m-nl))
(4 m-causal-cvent
(ante i-m-fan-rotor-imbalance)
(ensq i-m-n2))
(5 m-causal-event 
(ante i-m-n2)
(ensq i-m-fuel-flow))
(6 m-causal-event 
(ante i-m*n2)
(ensq i-m-egt)))
(id "Boeing Test Flight F-6")
(date "6’’)
(airline "flight test data")
(flight “flight test data")
(aircraft "flight test data")
; — Contest Variables 
(phase-of-flight i-m-dcsccnt)
(weather i-m-cloudy)
(workload i-m-moderate)
(cngine-commanded-status i-m-max-powcr)
; — Symptoms
(ash-cloud i-m-visible)
(fuel-flow m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high) (trend i-m-increases))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high) (trend i-m-increases))
(3 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-high) (trend i-m-increases))
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high) (trend i-m-increases)))
(nl m-group
(l m-sensor-reading (status i-m-normal))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-decreascs))
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-decreases))
(4 m-sensor-Teading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-decreases)))
(n2 m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-normal))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-decreascs))
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-dccreases))
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-dccreases)))
(egt m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-normal))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-normal))
(3 m-sensor-Teading (status i-m-high) (trend i-m-increases))
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high) (trend i-m-increases)))
)
)
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B.7 Foreign Object Ingestion
On November 12, 1975, an Overseas National Airways DC-10-30 (Flight 32) crashed while 
attempting to take off from John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New York [NTSB- 
AAR-76-19J. During the m takeoff roll a large number o f sea gulls rose from the runway and were 
ingested into the engine. The number 3 engine disintegrated. The takeoff was rejected and the air­
craft crashed off the end o f the runway. The NTSB determined that the probable cause of the acci­
dent was the disintegration and subsequent fire in the number 3 engine when it ingested a latge 
number of sea gulls.
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; Overseas National Airways 
; NTSB-AAR-76-19 
(self *casell*
*<
; -  Solution Data 
(fault i-m-bird-ingestion)
(events m-group 
(1 m-causal-event 
(ante i-m-bird-ingestion)
(ensq i-m-fan-blade-damoge))
(2 m-causal-event
(ante i-m-fan-blade-damagc)
(ensq i-m-fan-rotor-imbalancc))
(3 m-causal-event
(ante i-m-fan-rotor-imbalance)
(ensq i-m-nl))
(4 m-causal-cvent
(ante i-m-fan-rotor-imbalance)
(ensq i-m-n2))
(5 m-causal-event 
(ante i-m-n2)
(ensq i-m-fuel-flow))
(6 m-causal-event 
(ante i-m-n2)
(ensq i-m-egt))
(7 m-causal-event 
(ante i-m-fuel-flow)
(ensq i-m-epr)))
; — id features
(id "Overseas National Airways F-32") 
(date "November 12,1975”)
(airline "Overseas National Airways") 
(flight "Flight 32")
(aircraft "DC-10-30”)
; — Context Variables 
(phase-of-flight i-m-takc-off)
; — Symptoms 
(fuel-flow m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i 
(2 m-sensor-reading (status 
(3 m-sensor-reading (status 
(4 m-sensor-reading (status 
(nl m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status 
(2 m-sensor-reading (status 
(3 m-sensor-reading (status 
(4 m-sensor-reading (status 
(n2 m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status 
(2 m-scnsor-Tcading (status 
(3 m-sensor-reading (status 
(4 m-sensor-reading (status 
(egt m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status 
(2 m-sensoT-rcading (status 
(3 m-sensor-reading (status 
(4 m-sensor-reading (status 
(epr m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status 
(2 m-sensor-reading (status 
(3 m-sensor-reading (status 
(4 m-sensor-reading (status
-m-normal))
-m-fluctuates))
-m-fluctuales))
-m-low)))
-m-fluctuates))
-m-high) (trend i-m-fluctuales)) 
m-high) (trend i-m-decreascs)) 
m-low) (trend i-m-stable)))
-m-normal))
-m-high) (trend i-m-fluctuates)) 
-m-high) (trend i-m-decreases)) 
m-low) (trend i-m-stable)))
m-normal))
m-high) (trend i-m-fluctuates)) 
•m-high) (trend i-m-fluctuates)) 
m-high) (trend i-m-stable)))
m-normal))
m-high) (trend i-m-fluctuates)) 
m-high) (trend i-m-decreases)) 
m-low) (trend i-m-stable)))
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B .8 Fan Blade Damage
On January 8,1989, a British Midland Airways Boeing 737-400 (G-OBME) was climbing through 
28,300 feet when the outer panel of one blade in the fan of the No 1 Cleft) engine detached. This 
gave rise to a series of compressor stalls in the No 1 engine, which resulted in airframe shudder­
ing. Believing that the No 2 engine had suffered damage, the crew shut that engine down. The 
shuddering caused by the surging of the No 1 engine ceased as soon as the No 2 engine was throt­
tled back, which persuaded the crew that they had dealt correctly with the emergency. The aircraft 
struck a field.
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; Midlands Accident G-OBME 
; Air Accident Report 4/90, Department of TVansport 
(self *casel2lt'
'{
; — Solution Data
(fault i-m-fan-blade-damagc)
(events m-group
(1 m-causal-event
(ante i-m-fan-blade-damage)
(ensq i-m-fan-rotor-imbalance))
(2 m-causal-event
(ante i-m-fan-rotor-imbaloncc)
(ensq i-m-fan-vib))
(3 m-causal-event 
(ante i-m-fan-vib)
Scnsq i-m-nl))4 m-causal-event 
(ante i-m-fan-vib)
(ensq i-m-n2»
(5 m-causal-event 
(ante i-m-n2)
(ensq i-m-fuel-flow))
(6 m-causal-event 
(ante i-m-n2)
(ensq i-m-egt)))
; — id features
(id "Midlands Airways 1989 G-OBME”)
(date "January 1989")
(airline "Midlands Airways”)
(aircraft "Boeing 737-400”)
(engine "General Electric CFM56")
; — Context Variables 
(phase-of-flight i-m-climb-out)
; — Symptoms 
(fan-vib m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high))
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high))
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high)))
(fuel-flow m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-normal))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-Iow))
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-Iow))
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m*low)))
(nl m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-fluctuates))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high) (trend i-m-fluctuates)) 
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high) (trend i-m-dccrcases)) 
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-!ow) (trend i-m-stable)))
(n2 m-group
(1 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-normal))
(2 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-high) (trend i-m-fluctuates)) 
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high) (trend i-m-decreases)) 
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-Iow) (trend i-m-stable))) 
(egt m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-normal))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high))
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high))
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high)))
)
)
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B.9 Fan Blade Damage
On June 9, 1989, a Dan Air Boeing 737-400 (G-BNNL) suffered a failure in the number 1 engine 
[AAIB-AAR-4/90]. The crew identified the failed engine correctly and completed a full shut­
down drill. Examination of the engine after landing showed that the fan had been massively dam­
aged, with severe damage to the leading edges of all blades. One blade had fractured close to the 
root and another just below the midspan shroud, both entirely by overload rupture. There was a 
third blade fracture, however, just above the mid-span shroud which appeared to be very similar to 
a blade from number 1 engine of ME.
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; Dan Air G-BNNL
; Air Accident Report 4/90, Deportment of Transport 
(setf *casel3*
'(
; — Solution Data
(fault i-m-fan-bladc-domagc)
(events m-group
(1 m-causal-event
(ante i-m-fan-blade-damagc)
(ensq i-m-fan-rotor-imbalance))
(2 m-causal-event
(ante i-m-fan-rotor-imbalancc)
(ensq i-m-fan-vib))
(3 m-causal-event 
(ante i-m-fan-vib)
(ensq i-m-nl))
(4 m-causal-event 
(ante i-m-fan-vib)
(ensq i-m-n2))
(5 m-causal-event 
(ante i-m-n2)
(ensq i-m-fuel-flow))
(6 m-causal-event 
(ante i-m-n2)
(ensq i-m-egt)))
; — id features
(id "Dan Air 1989 G-BNNL")
(date “June 9.1989")
(airline "Dan Air")
(aircraft "Boeing 737-400")
(engine "General Electric CFM56”)
; — Context Variables 
(phase-of-flight i-m-climb-out)
(engine-commanded-status i-m-climb-power)
; — Symptoms 
(fan-vib m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high))
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high))
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high)))
(fuel-flow m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-normal))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low))
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low))
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low)))
(nl m-group; n
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-fluctuates))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-Iow) (trend i-m-fluctuatcs)) 
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-dccrcases)) 
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-stable))) 
(n2 m-group; n
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-normal))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-Iow) (trend i-m-fluctuatcs)) 
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-decrcascsj) 
(4 m-sensoT-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-stable))) 
(egt m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-normal))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high))
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high))
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high)))
)
)
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B.JO Fan Blade Damage
On June 11,1989, a British Midland Airways Boeing 737-400 (G-OBMG) suffered a failure in the 
number 2 engine [AAIB-AAR-4/90], The aircraft landed successfully. Examination of the number 
2 engine revealed that the outer panel of one fan blade had detached outboard of the mid-span 
shroud and become lodged in the space between the fan and fan outlet guide vanes. Some damage 
had occurred to the fan abradable liner and the forward acoustic panels, but apart from this there 
appeared to have been very little damage to the engine. It was also found that there had been loos­
ening of several pipe unions and of the MEC to fuel pump attachment nuts.
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B Case Library B.10 Fan Blade Damage
; Midland Airways O-OBMO 
; Air Accident Report 4/90, Department of Transport 
(setf *casel4*
‘(
; — Solution Data 
; (fault i-m-fan-blade-damagc)
; (events m-group 
; (1 m-causal-event 
; (ante i-m-fan-blade-damage)
; (ensq i-m-fan-rotor-imbalnncc))
; (2 m-causal-event 
; (ante i-m-fan-rotor-imbalance)
; (ensq i-m-fan-vib))
; (3 m-causal-event 
; (ante i-m-fan-vib)
; (ensq i-m-nl))
; (4 m-causal-event 
; (ante i-m-fan-vib)
; (ensq i-m-n2))
; (5 m-causal-cvent 
; (ante i-m-n2)
; (ensq i-m-fuel-flow))
; (6 m-causal-event 
; (ante i-m-n2)
; (ensq i-m-egt)))
; — id features
(id "Midland Airways 1989 G-OBMG")
(date "June 11, 1989")
(airline “Midland Airways")
(aircraft “Boeing 737-400")
(engine “General Electric CFM56")
; — Context Variables 
(phase-of-flight i-m-climb-out)
(engine-commandcd-status i-m-climb-powcr)
; — Symptoms 
(fan-vib m-group
(1 m-sensor-reaaing (status i-m-high))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high))
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high))
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high)))
(fuel-flow m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-norma]))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-Iow))
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low))
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low)))
(nl m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-fluctuatcs))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high) (trend i-m-fluctuates)) 
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-decreases)) 
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-stable)))
(n2 m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-normal))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high) (trend i-m-fluctuatcs)) 
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high) (trend i-m-dccrcases)) 
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-stable))) 
(cgt m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-normol))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high))
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high))
(4 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-high)))
)
)
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B. 11 Turbine Blade Separation
On July 19, 1970, a United Airlines’ Boeing 737-222 (Flight 611) crashed shortly after taking off 
from the Philadelphia International Airport [NTSB-AAR-72-9]. During takeoff, the number 1 
engine failed. The captain thought that both engines were spooling down and reasoned that they 
both had failed. Therefore, he decided to reject the takeoff and land the aircraft on the existing run­
way. The aircraft came to a stop past the end of the runway. The NTSB determined that a first stage 
turbine blade had failed in the number 1 engine which caused the engine to cease rotation. The 
number 2 engine was operable throughout the flight.
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B Case Library B.IJ Turbine Blade Separation
; United Airlines 1970
; Air Accident Report 4/90, Department of Transport 
j (self *cascI5*
^; — Solution Data
(fault i-m-turbine-blade-scparntion)
(events m-group
(1 m-causal-event
(ante i-m-turbine-blade-separation)
(ensq i-m-turbine-rotor-imbalance))
(2 m-causal-event
(ante i-m-turbine-rotor-imbalance)
(ensq i-m-nl))
(3 m-causal-event
(ante i-m-turbine-rolor-imbalancc)
(ensq i-m-n2))
(4 m-causal-event 
(ante i-m-n2)
(ensq i-m-fuel-flow))
(5 m-causal-event 
(ante i-m-fuel-flow)
(ensq i-m-epr))
(6 m-causal-event 
(ante i-m-n2)
(ensq i-m-cgt)))
; — id features
(id "United Airlines F-611")
(date "July 19,1970")
(airline "United Airlines”)
(aircraft "Boeing 737-222")
(flight “611”)
; — Context Variables 
(phase-of-flight i-m-climb-oul)
(engine-commanded-status i-m-climb-power)
; — Symptoms 
(epr m-group
(1 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-dccrcases)) 
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low))
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low))
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low)))
(fuel-flow m-group
(1 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-normal))
(2 m-sensor-TCading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-decreases))) 
(nl m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-decrcases))) 
(n2 m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-Iow) (trend i-m-decreases)) 
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-zero))
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-zero))
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-zero)))
(egt m-group
(1 m-sensor-Teading (status i-m-normal))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high) (trend i-m-increascs)) 
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high) (trend i-m-stablc))
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high) (trend i-m-decTeases)))
)
)
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B. 12 Turbine Blade Separation
On May 21, 1978 an American Airlines’ Boeing 727 (Flight 566) experienced a engine failure in 
its number one engine just after rotation on take-off from Greater Cincinnati airport, Cincinnati, 
Ohio [SchutteJ. The captain performed emergency shut-down procedures on the engine and 
returned to the airport. The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the engine fail­
ure was caused by several turbine blade separations. Just after rotation the captain noted that EGT 
was increasing and then started decreasing.
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B Case Library B.12 Turbine Blade Separation
; American Airlines 1978 
>
(sctf *casel6*
'(
; — Solution Data
; (fault i-m-turbine-bladc-separation)
; (events m-group
; (1 m-causal-cvcnt
; (ante i-m-turbine-bladc-scparation)
; (ensq i-m-turbine-rotor-imbalancc))
; (2 m-causal-event 
; (ante i-m-turbine-rotor-imbalancc)
; (ensq i-m-nl))
; (3 m-causal-evcnt 
; (ante i-m-turbine-rotor-imbalance)
; (ensq i-m-n2))
; (4 m-causal-evcnt 
; (ante i-m-n2)
; (ensq i-m-fuel-llow))
; (5 m-causal-event 
; (ante i-m-fuel-flow)
; (ensq i-m-epr))
; (6 m-causal-evcnt 
; (ante i-m-n2)
; (ensq i-m-egt)))
; — id features
(id "American Airlines F-566”)
(date "May 21,1978")
(airline “American Airlines")
(aircraft "Boeing 727")
(flight "566")
; — Context Variables 
(phase-of-flight i-m-takc-off)
(engine-commanded-status i-m-take-ofi)
; -- Symptoms 
(epr m-group
(1 m-sensor-rcading (status i-m-normal))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high) (trend i-m-increases)) 
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-decreases)) 
(4 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-low)))
(fuel-flow m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-normal))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-normal))
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-decreases)) 
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low)))
(nl m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-normal))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-dccreascs)) 
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-Iow) (trend i-m-decreases)) 
(4 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-decrcascs))) 
(n2 m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-normal))
(2 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-dccrcascs)) 
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-dccreascs)) 
(4 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-Iow) (trend i-m-decreases))) 
(cgt m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high) (trend i-m-incrcoscs)) 
(2 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-high) (trend i-m-increases)) 
(3 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-high) (trend i-m-dccrcascs)) 
(4 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-Iow) (trend i-m-dccrcascs)))
)
)
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B.13 Engine Separation
On May 25, 1979 an American Airlines DC-10-10 (Flight 191) crashed into an open field north­
west of Chicago-O’Hare International Airport [NTSB-AAR-79-17]. During takeoff rotation, the 
left engine and pylon assembly, and about 3 feet of the leading edge o f the left wing separated 
from the aircraft. The aircraft began to roll to the left until the wings were past the vertical posi­
tion. During the roll, the aircraft’s nose pitched down below the horizon and crashed. The NTSB 
determined that the probable cause of this accident was the asymmetrical stall and the ensuing roll 
o f the the aircraft at a critical point during takeoff. This was caused by the uncommanded retrac­
tion of the left wing outboard leading edge slats and the loss of the stall warning and slat disagree­
ment indication systems resulting from separation of the number 1 engine and pylon assembly. 
The NTSB determined that the accident would have been survivable had the flight crew known 
that the stall warning and the slat disagreement indication systems were inoperative.
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B Case Library B.13 Engine Separation
; American Airlines 1979 
; Engine Separation 
(setf*casel7*
‘<
; — Solution Data
(fault i-m-engine-scparation)
(events m-group
(1 m-causal-event
(ante i-m-engine-scparation)
(ensq i-m-egt))
(2 m-causal-evcnt
(ante i-m-engine-scparation)
(ensq i-m-nl))
(3 m-causal-evcnt
(ante i-m-cngine-separntion)
(ensq i-m-n2))
(4 m-causal-evcnt
(ante i-m-engine-separation)
(ensq i-m-fuel-flow))
(5 m-causal-event
(ante i-m-engine-separation)
(ensq i-m-epr)))
; — id features
(id “American Airlines F-191”)
(date “May 25,1979")
(airline “American Airlines")
(aircraft "DC-10-10")
(flighf'191")
; — Context Variables 
(phase-of-flight i-m-takc-off) 
(engine-commanded-status i-m-toke-ofl) 
; — Symptoms 
(cpr m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-zero))) 
(fuel-flow m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-zcro))) 
(n l m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-zero))) 
(n2 m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-zero))) 
(cgt m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-zcro)))
)
)
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B.14 Bad Fuel Controller
On February 19, 1985 a China Airlines’ Boeing 747 (Flight 006) was cruising on autopilot when 
the crew diagnosed a flame-out in the number four engine [NTSB-AAR-86-03]. The engine, had a 
bad fuel controller and had not flamed out but was suffering from a condition known as “bleed-air 
hogging.” The crew became preoccupied with the failure and did not notice that the controls on the 
autopilot had reached their maximum allowable correction and that the aircraft was engaged in a 
right bank. When the captain tried to correct for the problem, he reasoned that all of the attitude 
indicators had failed (they had not). The ensuing actions put the aircraft into a vertical dive. Dur­
ing the dive the crew made a third mis-diagnosis that all of the engines were flamed-out (in fact, 
only one engine had flamed out and it is this engine that is used in this case). Finally the captain 
regained control of the aircraft and all engines were “restarted." The aircraft suffered severe stress 
damage and made a safe landing in San Francisco. The NTSB determined that the accident was 
caused by a faulty fuel controller and the flight crew’s poor monitoring of systems.
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B Case Library B.14 Bad Fuel Controller
; China Airlines 006 
; NTSB-AAR-86-03 
(self *cascl8*
‘<
; — Fault
; (fault i-m-fuel-controllcr)
; (events m-group 
; (I m-causal-event 
; (ante i-m-fuel-controller)
; (ensq i-m-fuel-flow))
; (2 m-causal-event 
; (ante i-m-fuel-flow)
; (ensq i-m-nl))
; (3 m-eausal-event 
; (ante i-m-nl)
; (ensq i-m-n2))
; (4 m-causal-cvent 
; (ante i-m-n2)
; (ensq i-m-egt))
; (5 m-causal-event 
; (ante i-m-fuel-flow)
; (ensq i-m-epr)))
(id “China Air F-006")
(date "February 19")
(airline "China Air”)
(flight “006")
(aircraft "Boeing 747")
; — Context Variables 
(phase-of-flight i-m-cruisc)
(workload 1-m-high)
(engine-commanded-status i-m-mid-powcr)
; — Symptoms 
(egt m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-normal) (trend i-m-dccreascs)) 
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-stable))
(3 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-Iow) (trend i-m-dccrcases))
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-stable)))
(nl m-group
(1 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-normal) (trend i-m-dccreascs)) 
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-stable))
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-dccrcases))
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-stable)))
(n2 m-group
(1 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-normal) (trend i-m-decreases)) 
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-stable))
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-Iow) (trend i-m-dccrcases))
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-stable)))
(epr m-group
(1 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-normal) (trend i-m-decreases)) 
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-dccrcascs))
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-decreases))
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-stable))) 
(fuel-flow m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-decreases))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-stable))
(3 m-sensor-rcading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-decreases))
(4 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-stable)))
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B.15 Volcanic Ash Ingestion
On December 15, 1989 a Boeing 747-400 was flying at 25,000 feet near Anchorage, Alaska when 
it experienced flameouts on all four engines [Lloyd 1990]. The flameouts were due to volcanic ash 
ingestion from a cloud produced by an eruption of Mt. Redoubt during the previous day. The flight 
crew restarted engines No 1 and 2 at 13,000 feet and were able to maintain altitude as they 
restarted the remaining engines. The airplane made an uneventful landing at Anchorage.
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B Case Library B.15 Volcanic Ash Ingestion
; Mount Redoubt, 1989 
(sctf *casel9*
'(
; — Solution Data
(Fault i-m-volcanic-ash-ingcstion)
(events m-group
(1 m-causal-event
(ante i-m-volcanic-ash-ingcstion)
(ensq i-m-fan-blade-damage))
(2 m-causal-event
(ante i-m-fan-bladc-damagc) 
(ensq i-m-fan-rotor-imbalance)) 
(3 m-causal-event
(ante i-m-fan-rotor-imbalancc) 
(ensq i-m-nl))
(4 m-causal-cvent
(ante i-m-fan-rotor-imbalancc) 
(ensq i-m-n2))
(5 m-causal-event 
(ante i-m-n2)
(ensq i-m-egt)))
(id “Mount Redoubt”)
(date "December 15,1989”)
(aircraft “Boeing 747-400”)
(engine “General Electric CF6-80-C2”) 
; — Context Variables 
(phnse-of-flight i-m-dcscent)
(weather i-m-cloudy)
; — Symptoms
(glow-in-engines i-m-visible)
(smoke i-m-visible)
(nl m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low)) 
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-Iow)) 
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low)) 
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-Iow))) 
(n2 m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-Iow)) 
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-Iow)) 
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-Iow)) 
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-Iow))) 
(egt m-group
(1 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-Iow)) 
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-Iow)) 
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-Iow)) 
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-Iow))) 
(epr m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low)) 
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-Iow))
(3 m-sensor-rcading (status i-m-Iow)) 
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low)))
)
)
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B.16 Volcanic Aslt Ingestion
In June 1982, the Galunggung Volcano on the island of Java erupted. A Boeing 747 encountered 
the volcanic debris and experienced fiame-outs on three engines while the aircraft was at 33,000 
feet. One engine was successfully restarted and an uneventful two-engine landing was accom­
plished [Lloyd 1990].
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B Case Library B.16 Volcanic Ash Ingestion
; Galunggung, 1982 
(sctf *case20*
*<
; — Solution Data
; (fault i-m-volcanic-ash-ingcstion)
; (events m-group
; (1 m-causal-event
; (ante i-m-volcanic-ash-ingcstion)
; (ensq i-m-fan-blade-damage))
; (2 m-causal-event 
; (ante i-m-fan-blade-damagc)
; (ensq i-m-fan-rotor-imbalancc))
; (3 m-causal-event 
; (ante i-m-fan-iolor-imbalance)
; (ensq i-m-nl))
; (4 m-causal-event.
; (ante i-m-fan-ro tor-imbalance)
; (ensq i-m-n2))
; (5 m-causal-event 
; (ante i-m-n2)
; (ensq i-m-egt)))
(id "Galunggung")
(date “June 1982")
(aircraft “Boeing 747”)
(engine “P&W JT9D-7As”)
; — Context Variables 
; — Symptoms
(glow-in-engines i-m-visible)
(nl m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-Iow)) 
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low)) 
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low)) 
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-Iow))) 
(n2 m-group
(1 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-Iow)) 
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low)) 
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-Iow)) 
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-!ow)j) 
(egt m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low)) 
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low)) 
(3 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-Iow)) 
(4 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-Iow))) 
(epr m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low)) 
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low)) 
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low)) 
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low)))
)
)
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B.17 Massive Water Ingestion
On April 4, 1977 a Southern Airways DC-9 (Flight 242) crashed in New Hope, Georgia [NTSB- 
AAR-78-3]. The aircraft had flown through heavy thunderstorms and had lost both engines. The 
crew attempted an emergency landing on a highway and crashed. The NTSB determined that mas­
sive water ingestion into the engines accompanied by thrust level movement induced severe stall­
ing in and major damage to the engine compressors. The NTSB determined that the aircraft might 
have been able to survive the weather had the flight crew not made significant movements in the 
thrust level.
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B Case Library B.17 Massive Water Ingestion
; Southern Airways F-242 
; NTSB-AAR-78-3 
(setf *case21*
*(
; — Solution Data 
; (fault i-m-water-ingestion)
; (events m-group 
i (1 m-causal-evcnt 
; (ante i-m-water-ingcstion)
; (ensq i-m-fan-blade-damage))
; (2 m-causal-event 
j (ante i-m-fan-blade-damagc)
; (ensq i-m-fan-rotor-imbalance))
; (3 m-causal-event 
; (ante i-m-fan-rotor-imbalance)
; (ensq i-m-nl))
; (4 m-causal-event 
; (ante i-m-fan-rotor-imbalancc)
; (ensq i-m-n2))
; (5 m-causal-evcnt 
; (ante i-m-n2)
; (ensq i-m-egt))
; (6 m-causal-event 
; (ante i-m-n2)
; (ensq i-m-fuel-flow)))
; (7 m-causal-evcnt 
; (ante i-m-77)
; (ensq i-m-epr)))
(id ‘‘Southern Airways F-242")
(date‘‘April 4,1977")
(aircraft “DC-9")
; — Context Variables 
(temp i-m-frcczing)
; -  Symptoms 
(nl m-group
(1 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-normal))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-decreases)) 
(3 m-sensor-Teading (status i-m-Iow) (trend i-m-decreases)) 
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-Iow)))
(n2 m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-normal))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-decTeascs)) 
(3 m-scnsor-Teading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-decTcases)) 
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-Iow)))
(egt m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-decrcascs)) 
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-decreases)) 
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-decreases)) 
(4 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-low)))
(epr m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-normal))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-normal))
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-dccrcascs)) 
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low)))
(fuel-flow m-group
(1 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-normal))
(2 m-sensor-Tcading (status i-m-normal))
(3 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-normal))
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-decrcascs)))
)
)
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B.18 Ice Ingestion
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B Case Library B.18 Ice Ingestion
; Hypothetical scenario 
>
(sctf *case51*
*(
; — Fault
(fault i-m-ice-ingestion)
(events m-group 
(1 m-causal-event 
(ante i-m-ice-ingcstion)
(ensq i-m-fan-blade-damagc))
(2 m-causal-evcnt
(ante i-m-fan-blade-damagc)
(ensq i-m-fan-rotor-imbalance))
(3 m-causal-event
(ante i-m-fan-rotor-imbalance)
(ensq i-m-fan-vib))
(4 m-causal-event
(ante i-m-fan-rotor-imbalance)
(ensq i-m-nl))
(5 m-causal-event 
(ante i-m-fan-vib)
(ensq i-m-n2)))
(id "Hypothetical sccnnrio 51")
(date “Hypothetical scenario 51”)
(airline "Hypothetical scenario 51”)
(flight "Hypothetical scenario 51")
(aircraft "Hypothetical scenario 51”)
; — Context Variables 
(phase-of-flight i-m-ground-start)
(weather i-m-clear)
(workload i-m-moderatc)
(cngine-commanded-sfatus i-m-start)
; — Symptoms 
(nl m-group
SI m-sensor-reading (status i-m-normal) (trend i-m-increases)) 2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-increases))
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-increases))
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-stable)))
(n2 m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-normal) (trend i-m-incrcascs)) 
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-incrcascs))
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-incrcascs))
(4 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-stable))) 
(fan-vib m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high) (trend i-m-incrcascs))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high) (trend i-m-increases))
(3 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high) (trend i-m-increascs))
(4 m-sensor-Teading (status i-m-high) (trend i-m-stable)))
)
)
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; Hypothetical scenario 
(sctf *case52+
*(
(id “Hypothetical scenario 52")
(date “Hypothetical scenario 52")
(airline' Hypothetical scenario 52")
(flight “Hypothetical scenario 52")
(aircraft "Hypothetical scenario 52”)
; — Context Variables
(phase-of-flight i-m-ground-start)
(weather i-m-clear)
(workload i-m-moderatc)
(engine-conunanded-status i-m-start)
; — Symptoms
(compressor-vib m-group
(1 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-high))
(2 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-high)))
(thrust m-group
(1 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-low))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low) (trend i-m-increascs))) 
(fan-vib m-group
(1 m-scnsor-rcading (status i-m-high))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-high)))
(fuel-flow m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low)))
(n2 m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m*normal)))
(egt m-group
(1 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low))
(2 m-sensor-reading (status i-m-low)))
)
)
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